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Abstract
The recent line of study on randomness extractors has been a great success, resulting in ex-
citing new techniques, new connections, and breakthroughs to long standing open problems in
several seemingly different topics. These include seeded non-malleable extractors, privacy ampli-
fication protocols with an active adversary, independent source extractors (and explicit Ramsey
graphs), and non-malleable codes in the split state model. Previously, the best constructions
are given in [Li17]: seeded non-malleable extractors with seed length and entropy requirement
O(log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)) for error ǫ; two-round privacy amplification protocols with opti-
mal entropy loss for security parameter up to Ω(k/ log k), where k is the entropy of the shared
weak source; two-source extractors for entropy O(log n log logn); and non-malleable codes in the
2-split state model with rate Ω(1/ logn). However, in all cases there is still a gap to optimum
and the motivation to close this gap remains strong.
In this paper, we introduce a set of new techniques to further push the frontier in the above
questions. Our techniques lead to improvements in all of the above questions, and in several
cases partially optimal constructions. This is in contrast to all previous work, which only obtain
close to optimal constructions. Specifically, we obtain:
1. A seeded non-malleable extractor with seed length O(log n) + log1+o(1)(1/ǫ) and entropy
requirement O(log logn+ log(1/ǫ)), where the entropy requirement is asymptotically op-
timal by a recent result of Gur and Shinkar [GS18];
2. A two-round privacy amplification protocol with optimal entropy loss for security param-
eter up to Ω(k), which solves the privacy amplification problem completely;1
3. A two-source extractor for entropy O( log n log lognlog log log n ), which also gives an explicit Ramsey
graph on N vertices with no clique or independent set of size (logN)O(
log log logN
log log log logN
); and
4. The first explicit non-malleable code in the 2-split state model with constant rate, which
has been a major goal in the study of non-malleable codes for quite some time. One small
caveat is that the error of this code is only (an arbitrarily small) constant, but we can
also achieve negligible error with rate Ω(log log logn/ log logn), which already improves
the rate in [Li17] exponentially.
We believe our new techniques can help to eventually obtain completely optimal constructions
in the above questions, and may have applications in other settings.
∗Supported by NSF award CCF-1617713.
1Except for the communication complexity, which is of secondary concern to this problem.
1 Introduction
The study of randomness extractors has been a central line of research in the area of pseudoran-
domness, where the goal is to understand how to use randomness more efficiently in computation.
As fundamental objects in this area, randomness extractors are functions that transform imperfect
random sources into nearly uniform random bits. Their original motivation is to bridge the gap
between the uniform random bits required in standard applications (such as in randomized algo-
rithms, distributed computing, and cryptography), and practical random sources which are almost
always biased (either because of natural noise or adversarial information leakage). However the
study of these objects has led to applications far beyond this motivation, in several different fields
of computer science and combinatorics (e.g., coding theory, graph theory, and complexity theory).
The inputs to a randomness extractor are usually imperfect randomness, modeled by the notion
of general weak random sources with a certain amount of entropy.
Definition 1.1. The min-entropy of a random variable X is
H∞(X) = min
x∈supp(X)
log2(1/Pr[X = x]).
For X ∈ {0, 1}n, we call X an (n,H∞(X))-source, and we say X has entropy rate H∞(X)/n.
An extensively studied model of randomness extractors is the so called seeded extractors, in-
troduced by Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96]. The inputs to a seeded extractor are a general weak
random source and a short independent uniform random seed. The random seed is necessary here
since it is well known that no deterministic extractor with one general weak source as input can
exist. Such extractors have wide applications in computer science.
Definition 1.2. (Seeded Extractor) A function Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ε)-extractor
if for every source X with min-entropy k and independent Y which is uniform on {0, 1}d,
|Ext(X,Y )− Um| ≤ ǫ.
If in addition we have |(Ext(X,Y ), Y )− (Um, Y )| ≤ ǫ then we say it is a strong (k, ε)-extractor.
Through a long line of research, we now have explicit constructions of seeded extractors with
almost optimal parameters (e.g., [LRVW03, GUV09, DW08, DKSS09]). In the last decade or so,
the focus has shifted to several different but related models of randomness extractors, including
seedless extractors and non-malleable extractors. The study of these topics has also been quite
fruitful, leading to breakthroughs to several long standing open problems.
1.1 Seedless extractors
As the name suggests, a seedless extractor uses no uniform seed, and the only inputs are weak
random sources. Here, again we have two different cases. In the first case, one puts additional
restrictions on a single weak random source in order to allow possible extraction, thus obtaining
deterministic extractors for special classes of (structured) sources. In the second case, the sources
are still general weak random sources, but the extractor needs to use more than one sources. To
make extraction possible, one typically assumes the input sources to the extractor are independent,
and this kind of extractors are sometimes called independent source extractors.
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Since the pioneering work of Chor and Goldreich [CG88], the study of independent source extrac-
tors has gained significant attention due to their close connections to explicit Ramsey graphs, and
their applications in distributed computing and cryptography with general weak random sources
[KLRZ08, KLR09]. The goal here is to give explicit constructions that match the probabilistic
bound: an extractor for just two independent (n, k) sources with k ≥ log n + O(1) that outputs
Ω(k) bits with exponentially small (in k) error. Note that an explicit two-source extractor for such
entropy (even with one bit output and constant error) will give an (strongly) explicit Ramsey graph
on N vertices with no clique or independent set of size O(logN), solving an open problem proposed
by Erdo˝s [Erd47] in his seminal paper that inaugurated the probabilistic method.
While early progress on this problem has been quite slow, with the best known construction in
almost 20 years only able to handle two independent (n, k) sources with k > n/2 [CG88], since 2004
there has been a long line of work [BIW04, BKS+05, Raz05, Bou05, Rao06, BRSW06, Li11, Li12b,
Li13b, Li13a, Li15b, Coh15, CZ16, Li16, CS16, CL16, Coh16a, BADTS17, Coh17, Li17] introducing
exciting new techniques to this problem. This line of work greatly improved the situation and led
to a series of breakthroughs. Now we have three source extractors for entropy k ≥ polylog(n)
that output Ω(k) bits with exponentially small error [Li15b], two-source extractors for entropy
k ≥ polylog(n) that output Ω(k) bits with polynomially small error [CZ16, Li16, Mek15], and
two-source extractors for entropy k ≥ O(log n log log n) that output one bit with any constant error
[Li17]. This also gives an explicit Ramsey graph on N vertices with no clique or independent set of
size (logN)O(log log logN). Interestingly and somewhat surprisingly, the most recent progress which
brought the entropy requirement close to optimal, has mainly benefited from the study of another
kind of extractors, the so called non-malleable extractors, which we now describe below.
1.2 Non-malleable extractors
Non-malleable extractors are strengthening of standard extractors, where one requires that the
output is close to uniform even given the output of the extractor on tampered inputs.
Definition 1.3 (Tampering Funtion). For any function f : S → S, We say f has no fixed points
if f(s) 6= s for all s ∈ S. For any n > 0, let Fn denote the set of all functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
Any subset of Fn is a family of tampering functions.
Depending on what the tampering function acts on, we also have different models of non-
malleable extractors. If the tampering acts on the seed of a seeded extractor, such extractors are
called seeded non-malleable extractors, originally introduced by Dodis and Wichs [DW09].
Definition 1.4. A function snmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a seeded non-malleable extrac-
tor for min-entropy k and error ǫ if the following holds: If X is an (n, k) source and A : {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}d is an arbitrary tampering function with no fixed points, then
|snmExt(X,Ud) ◦ snmExt(X,A(Ud)) ◦ Ud − Um ◦ snmExt(X,A(Ud)) ◦ Ud| < ǫ
where Um is independent of Ud and X.
If the tampering acts on the sources of an independent source extractor, then we have seedless
non-malleable extractors, originally introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b].
Definition 1.5. A function nmExt : ({0, 1}n)C → {0, 1}m is a (k, ǫ)-seedless non-malleable ex-
tractor for C independent sources, if it satisfies the following property: Let X1, · · · ,XC be C
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independent (n, k) sources, and f1, · · · , fC : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be C arbitrary tampering functions
such that there exists an fi with no fixed points,
2 then
|nmExt(X1, · · · ,XC) ◦ nmExt(f1(X1), · · · , fC(X2))− Um ◦ nmExt(f1(X1), · · · , fC(X2))| < ǫ.
Seeded non-malleable extractors and privacy amplification. Seeded non-malleable extrac-
tors were introduced by Dodis and Wichs [DW09], to study the basic problem of privacy amplifi-
cation [BBR88]. Consider the situation where two parties with local (non-shared) uniform random
bits try to convert a shared secret weak random source X into shared secret uniform random bits.
They do this by communicating through a channel, which is watched by an adversary with unlim-
ited computational power. Standard strong seeded extractors provide very efficient protocols for a
passive adversary (i.e., can only see the messages but cannot change them), but fail for an active
adversary (i.e., can arbitrarily change, delete and reorder messages). In the latter case, which is the
focus of this paper, the main goal is to design a protocol that uses as few number of interactions
as possible, and achieves a shared uniform random string R which has entropy loss (the difference
between the length of the output and H∞(X)) as small as possible. Such a protocol is defined with
a security parameter s, which means the probability that an active adversary can successfully make
the two parties output two different strings without being detected is at most 2−s. On the other
hand, if the adversary remains passive, then the two parties should achieve a shared secret string
that is 2−s-close to uniform. We refer the reader to [DLWZ14] for a formal definition.
A long line of work has been devoted to this problem [MW97, DKRS06, DW09, RW03, KR09,
CKOR10, DLWZ14, CRS14, Li12a, Li12b, Li15a, CGL16, Coh16b, Coh16c, CL16, Coh16a, Coh17,
Li17]. It is known that one round protocol can only exist when the entropy rate of X is bigger than
1/2, and the protocol has to incur a large entropy loss. When the entropy rate of X is smaller than
1/2, [DW09] showed that any protocol has to take at least two rounds with entropy loss at least
Ω(s). Achieving a two-round protocol with entropy loss O(s) for all possible security parameters s
is thus the holy grail of this problem (note that s can be at most Ω(k) where k = H∞(X)).
While early works on this problem used various techniques, in [DW09], Dodis and Wichs intro-
duced a major tool, the seeded non-malleable extractor defined above. They showed that two-round
privacy amplification protocols with optimal entropy loss can be constructed using explicit seeded
non-malleable extractors. Furthermore, non-malleable extractors exist when k > 2m+2 log(1/ε)+
log d+6 and d > log(n− k+1)+ 2 log(1/ε) + 5. Since then, the study of non-malleable extractors
has seen significant progress starting from the first explicit construction in [DLWZ14], with further
connections to independent source extractors established in [Li12b, Li13b, CZ16]. Previous to this
work, the best known seeded non-malleable extractor is due to the author [Li17], which works for
entropy k ≥ O(log n+log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)) and has seed length d = O(log n+log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)).
Although close to optimal, the extra O(log log(1/ǫ)) factor in the entropy requirement implies that
by using this extractor, one can only get two-round privacy amplification protocols with optimal
entropy loss for security parameter up to s = Ω(k/ log k). This still falls short of achieving the
holy grail, and may be problematic for some applications. For example, even if the shared weak
source has slightly super-logarithmic entropy, the error of the protocol can still be sub-polynomially
large; while ideally one can hope to get negligible error, which is important for other cryptographic
applications based on this. The only previous protocol that can achieve security parameter up to
2The original definition of seedless non-malleable independent source extractors in [CG14b] allows fixed points,
but the two definitions are equivalent up to a small loss in parameters. See Section 7 for details.
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s = Ω(k) is the work of [CKOR10], which has entropy loss O(log n+ s) but also uses O(log n+ s)
rounds of interactions, much larger than 2. This also results in a total communication complexity
of O((log n+ s)2) and requires the two parties’ local random bits to be at least this long.
Seedless non-malleable extractors and non-malleable codes. Seedless non-malleable ex-
tractors were first introduced by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b] to study non-malleable codes
[DPW10], a generalization of standard error correcting codes to handle a much larger class of at-
tacks. Informally, a non-malleable code is defined w.r.t. a specific family of tampering functions F .
The code consists of a randomized encoding function E and a deterministic decoding function D,
such that for any f ∈ F , if a codeword E(x) is modified into f(E(x)), then the decoded message
x′ = D(f(E(x))) is either the original message x or a completely unrelated message. The formal
definition is given in Section 7. In [DPW10], Dziembowski et. al showed that such codes can be
used generally in tamper-resilient cryptography to protect the memory of a device.
Even with such generalization, non-malleable codes still cannot exist if F is completely unre-
stricted. However, they do exist for many broad families of tampering functions. One of the most
studied families of tampering functions is the so called t-split-state model. Here, a k-bit message x is
encoded into a codeword with t parts y1, · · · , yt, each of length n. An adversary can then arbitrarily
tamper with each yi independently. In this case, the rate of the code is defined as k/(tn).
This model arises naturally in many applications, typically when different parts of memory are
used to store different parts of y1, · · · , yt. Such a code can also be viewed as a kind of “non-malleable
secret sharing scheme”. The case of t = 2 is the most useful and interesting setting, since t = 1
corresponds to the case where F is unrestricted. Again, there has been a lot of previous work on
non-malleable codes in this model. In this paper we will focus on the information theoretic setting.
Dziembowski et. al [DPW10] first proved the existence of non-malleable codes in the split-state
model. Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14a] showed that the optimal rate of such codes in the
2-split-state model is 1/2. Since then a major goal is to construct explicit non-malleable codes in
the 2-split-state model with constant rate. The first construction appears in [DKO13], with later
improvements in [ADL14, Agg14, ADKO15], but all constructions only achieve rate n−Ω(1).
Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b] found a way to construct non-malleable codes in the t-
split state model using non-malleable t-source extractors. Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ14]
constructed the first seedless non-malleable extractor, which works for 10 independent sources with
entropy (1 − γ)n, and consequently they obtained a constant rate non-malleable code in the 10-
split-state model. Subsequently, constructions of non-malleable two source extractors appeared
in [CGL16] and [Li17]. Both constructions work for min-entropy k = (1 − γ)n, and the former
gives a non-malleable code in the 2-split state model with rate n−Ω(1) while the latter achieves rate
Ω( 1logn). Very recently, a work by Kanukurthi et. al [KOS17] achieved constant rate in the 4-split
state model, and another one by Gupta et. al [GMW18] achieved constant rate in the 3-split state
model, but the best construction in the 2-split state model still only achieves rate Ω( 1logn) [Li17].
As can be seen from the above discussions, extensive past research has established strong con-
nections among these different topics, and provided solutions close to optimal. However, there still
remains a gap and the motivation to close this gap remains strong.
1.3 Our Results
In this paper we introduce a set of new techniques to further push the frontier in the above questions.
Our techniques lead to improvements in all the questions discussed, and in several cases partially
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optimal constructions. In contrast, all previous work only obtain close to optimal constructions.
Our first theorem gives explicit seeded non-malleable extractors with optimal entropy requirement.
Theorem 1.6. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any constant a ∈ N, a ≥ 2, any
n, k ∈ N and any 0 < ǫ < 1 with k ≥ C(log log n + a log(1/ǫ)), there is an explicit construction
of a strong seeded (k, ǫ) non-malleable extractor {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n) +
log(1/ǫ)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a ) and m = Ω(k).
Note that this theorem provides a trade-off between the entropy requirement and the seed
length. For example, if we take a = 2, then the entropy requirement is O(log log n+log(1/ǫ)) while
the seed length is O(log n)+2O(
√
log log(1/ǫ)) log(1/ǫ) = O(log n)+ log1+o(1)(1/ǫ). By a recent result
of Gur and Shinkar [GS18], the entropy requirement in our construction is asymptotically optimal.
Combined with the protocol in [DW09], this gives the following theorem.
Theorem 1.7. For any constant integer a ≥ 2 there exists a constant 0 < α < 1 such that for any
n, k ∈ N and security parameter s ≤ αk, there is an explicit two-round privacy amplification protocol
with entropy loss O(log log n + s), in the presence of an active adversary. The communication
complexity of the protocol is O(log n) + s2O(a(log s)
1
a ).
Our two-round protocol has optimal entropy loss for security parameter up to s = Ω(k), thus
achieving the holy grail of this problem. Compared to the O(log n+s)-round protocol in [CKOR10],
our protocol also has better dependence on n and significantly better communication complexity.
We remark that for clarity, the above theorem assumes an optimal seeded extractor with seed
length O(log(n/ǫ)) and entropy loss O(log(1/ǫ)). However the best known extractor with such seed
length [GUV09] has an additional entropy loss of αk (α is any constant), which will also appear
in the protocol (the same as in [DW09] and [CKOR10]). Yet this is just an artifact of current
seeded extractor constructions, and not of the protocol itself. Moreover, one can avoid this loss
by using the extractor in [RRV99], which has optimal entropy loss but larger seed length (e.g.,
O(log2 n log(1/ǫ) log(k))). This only affects the the communication complexity of the protocol.
We also remark that the O(log log n) term in both theorems is also the best possible (up to
constant) if one wants to apply the two-round protocol in [DW09]. This is because the output of
the non-malleable extractor is used in the second round as the key for a message authentication
code (MAC) that authenticates the seed of a strong seeded extractor with security parameter s.
Since the seed of the extractor uses at least Ω(log n) bits, the MAC requires a key of length at least
log log n+ s. See [DW09] for more details.
We can also achieve smaller seed length while requiring slightly larger entropy.
Theorem 1.8. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any n, k ∈ N and 0 < ǫ < 1 with
k ≥ C(log log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log log(1/ǫ)), there is an explicit construction of a strong seeded (k, ǫ)
non-malleable extractor {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n+log(1/ǫ)(log log(1/ǫ))2)3 and
m = Ω(k).
Theorem 1.9. There exists a constant 0 < α < 1 such that for any n, k ∈ N and security parameter
s ≤ αk/ log log k, there is an explicit two-round privacy amplification protocol with entropy loss
O(log log n + s), in the presence of an active adversary. The communication complexity of the
protocol is O(log n+ s log2 s).
3The exponent 2 can be reduced to be arbitrarily close to log 3.
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Remark 1.10. In both Theorem 1.6 and Theorem 1.8, the dependence on error ǫ in the seed length
and the entropy requirement can be switched. For example, in Theorem 1.6, we can also achieve
k ≥ C log log n + log(1/ǫ)2C·a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a and d = O(log n + a log(1/ǫ)). In other words, we can
achieve asymptotically optimal parameters in either the seed length or the entropy requirement,
but not in both. In addition,
We also have the following non-malleable two-source extractor and seeded non-malleable extractor.
Theorem 1.11. There exists a constant 0 < γ < 1 and a non-malleable two-source extractor for
(n, (1− γ)n) sources with error 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn) and output length Ω(n).
Theorem 1.12. There is a constant C > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0 and n, k ∈ N with k ≥
C(log log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)log log log(1/ǫ) ), there is an explicit strong seeded non-malleable extractor for (n, k)
sources with seed length d = O(log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)log log log(1/ǫ) ), error ǫ and output length Ω(k).
Combined with the techniques in [BADTS17], we obtain the following theorem which gives
improved constructions of two-source extractors and Ramsey graphs.
Theorem 1.13. For every constant ǫ > 0, there exists a constant C > 1 and an explicit two source
extractor Ext : ({0, 1}n)2 → {0, 1} for entropy k ≥ C logn log lognlog log logn with error ǫ.
Corollary 1.14. For every large enough integer N there exists a (strongly) explicit construction
of a K-Ramsey graph on N vertices with K = (logN)
O( log log logN
log log log logN
)
.
For non-malleable codes in the 2-split state model, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1.15. There are constants 0 < η, µ < 1 such that for any n ∈ N and 2− µnlogn ≤ ǫ ≤ η
there exists an explicit non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model with block length 2n, rate
Ω( log log log(1/ǫ)log log(1/ǫ) ) and error ǫ.
Note that if we choose ǫ = 2−c for some constant c > 1, then we get a non-malleable code with
rate Ω( log log clog c ) and error 2
−c. This gives the first construction of an explicit non-malleable code in
the 2-split-state model with constant rate. Note that the error can be arbitrarily small, and the
dependence of the rate on the error is pretty good. For example, even if one wants to achieve error
2−2100 , which is more than enough for any practical application, the rate is on the order of 1/16.
On the other hand, if we choose ǫ = 2−polylog(n), then we get a non-malleable code with negligible
error and rate Ω( log log lognlog logn ), which already improves the rate in [Li17] exponentially.
We can also achieve close to exponentially small error with an improved rate.
Theorem 1.16. For any n ∈ N there exists a non-malleable code with efficient encoder/decoder in
the 2-split-state model with block length 2n, rate Ω(log log n/ log n) and error ǫ = 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn).
1.4 Overview of The Constructions and Techniques
We demonstrate our techniques here by an informal overview of our constructions. Throughout
this section we will be mainly interested in the dependence of various parameters (e.g., seed length,
entropy requirement) on the error ǫ, since this makes the presentation cleaner. The dependence on
n comes from the alternating extraction between the seed and the source, thus the seed needs to
have an O(log n) term while the source only needs an O(log log n) term.
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All recent constructions of non-malleable extractors essentially follow the same high level sketch:
first obtain a small advice on L = O(log(1/ǫ)) bits such that with probability 1 − ǫ, the advice is
different from its tampered version. Then, use the rest of the inputs, together with a correlation
breaker with advice (informally introduced in [CGL16] and formally defined in [Coh16b]) to obtain
the final output. There are several constructions of the correlation breaker, with the most efficient
one using a non-malleable independence preserving merger (NIPM for short, introduced in [CS16]
and generalized in [CL16]). The NIPM takes an L×m random matrix V with m = O(log(1/ǫ)) and
use the other inputs to merge it into one output. It has the property that if the matrix has one row
which is uniform given the corresponding row in its tampered version4 (which can be obtained from
the advice and inputs), then the output is guaranteed to be uniform given the tampered output.
From now on, we assume the inputs to the extractor are two independent sources X and Y (in the
case of a seeded non-malleable extractor, Y can be viewed as the seed).
Previously, the best construction of an NIPM is due to the author [Li17], which works roughly
as follows. Suppose the matrix V is a deterministic function of the source X, then we first generate
ℓ = logL random variables (Y1, · · · , Yℓ) from Y , such that each Yi is close to uniform given the
previous random variables and their tampered versions (i.e., (Y1, Y
′
1 , · · · , Yi−1, Y ′i−1)). We call this
property the look-ahead property. Next, we run a simple merger for ℓ iterations, with each iteration
using a new Yi to merge every two consecutive rows in V , thus decreasing the number of rows by
a factor of 2. We output the final matrix V which has one row.
Let’s turn to the entropy requirement. In this construction each Yi needs to have at least
Ω(log(1/ǫ)) bits in order to ensure the error is at most ǫ, thus it is clear that Y needs to have
entropy at least Ω(ℓ log(1/ǫ)) = Ω(log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)). However, it turns out that X also needs
to have such entropy, for the following two reasons. First, in each iteration after we apply the simple
merger, the length of each row in the matrix decreases by a constant factor (due to the entropy loss
of any seeded extractor). Thus we cannot afford to just repeat the process for ℓ times since that
would require the original row in V (and hence X) to have entropy at least polylog(1/ǫ). Instead,
we again create ℓ random variables (X1, · · · ,Xℓ) from X with the look-ahead property, and in each
iteration after merging we use each row of the matrix to extract from a new Xi (using a standard
seeded extractor, and possibly after first extracting from another new Yi), to restore the length of
the rows in the matrix. We need the look-ahead property in (X1, · · · ,Xℓ) and (Y1, · · · , Yℓ) so that
after each iteration we can fix the previously used random variables and maintain the independence
of X and Y , as well as the fact that the matrix is a deterministic function of X. Each Xi again
needs at least Ω(log(1/ǫ)) bits so this puts a lower bound on the entropy of X.
Second, in order to prepare the random variables (Y1, · · · , Yℓ), we in fact run an alternating
extraction protocol between (part of) X and Y . This protocol lasts 2ℓ rounds between X and Y ,
and in each round either X or Y needs to spend Ω(log(1/ǫ)) random bits. This again puts a lower
bound of Ω(ℓ log(1/ǫ)) on the entropy of X.
We remark that the above description is slightly different from the standard definition of an
NIPM, where the only input besides the matrix V is Y . Indeed, in [Li17] it was presented as a
correlation breaker. However, these two objects are actually similar, and for this paper it is more
convenient to consider NIPMs with an additional input X, which is independent of Y but may be
correlated with V . We will use this notion here and formally define it in Section 4.
4Sometimes we also require the other rows to be uniform, in order to make the construction simpler. This is the
case of this paper, but we ignore the issue here for simplicity and clarity.
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Improved merger construction. We develop new techniques to break the above barriers. For
the first problem, our key observation is that we can recycle the entropy inX, similar in sprit to what
has been done in previous constructions of pseudorandom generators for small space computation
[Nis92, NZ96]. Indeed, the random variables (X1, · · · ,Xℓ) can be replaced by the original source X,
as long as we have slightly more (e.g., 2ℓ) Yi’s and they satisfy the look ahead property. To achieve
this we crucially use the property that the NIPM only needs one row of V to be uniform given
the corresponding row in its tampered version, and does not care about the dependence among
the rows of V (they can have arbitrary dependence). Consider a particular iteration i in which
we have just finished applying the simple merger. We can first fix all random variables {Yj} that
have been used so far, and conditioned on this fixing we know that X and Y are still independent,
and the matrix V is a deterministic function of X, which is independent of all random variables
obtained from Y . To restore the length of each row in V , we use each row of V to first extract
O(log(1/ǫ)) bits from Yj+1, and then extract back from the original source X. Note that we only
need to consider each row separately (since we don’t care about the dependence among them).
Assume row h in V has the property that Vh is uniform given V
′
h (the tampered version). Since
each random variable only has O(log(1/ǫ)) bits, as long as the entropy of X is c log(1/ǫ) for a large
enough constant c > 1, we can argue that conditioned on the fixing of (Vh, V
′
h), X still has entropy
at least some O(log(1/ǫ)). On the other hand since Vh is uniform given V
′
h, their corresponding
outputs after extracting from (Yj+1, Y
′
j+1) will also preserve this independence; and conditioned on
the fixing of (Vh, V
′
h), these outputs are deterministic functions of (Y, Y
′), which are independent
of (X,X ′). Thus they can be used to extract back from (X,X ′) and preserve the independence.
By standard properties of a strong seeded extractor, this holds even conditioned on the fixing of
(Yj+1, Y
′
j+1). Note that conditioned on the further fixing of (Yj+1, Y
′
j+1), the new matrix is again
a deterministic function of X, thus we can go into the next iteration. Therefore, by recycling the
entropy in X, altogether we only need X to have entropy some O(log(1/ǫ)). In each iteration we
use two new Yi’s so we need roughly 2ℓ such random variables.
However, we still need to address the second problem, where we need to generate the random
variables (Y1, · · · , Y2ℓ). The old way to generate them by using an alternating extraction protocol
requires entropy roughly O(ℓ log(1/ǫ)) from X. To solve this problem, we develop a new approach
that requires much less entropy from X. For simplicity assume that Y is uniform, we first take 2ℓ
slices Y i from Y , where Y i has size (2i − 1)d for some d = O(log(1/ǫ)). This ensures that even
conditioned on the fixing of (Y 1, Y ′1, · · · , Y i−1, Y ′i−1), the (average) conditional min-entropy of Yi
is at least (2i − 1)d − 2 · (2i−1 − 1)d = d. Then, we can take O(log(1/ǫ)) uniform bits obtained
from X, and use the same bits to extract Yi from Y
i for every i. As long as we use a strong seeded
extractor here, we are guaranteed that (Y1, · · · , Y2ℓ) satisfy the look-ahead property; and moreover
conditioned on the fixing of theO(log(1/ǫ)) bits fromX, we have that (Y1, · · · , Y2ℓ) is a deterministic
function of Y . Note here again we only require entropy O(log(1/ǫ)) from X, and together with
the approach described above this gives us a non-malleable extractor where X can have entropy
O(log(1/ǫ)). However Y will need to have entropy at least 22ℓO(log(1/ǫ)) = O(log3(1/ǫ)).
To improve the entropy requirement of Y , we note that in the above approach, we only used
part of X once to help obtaining the {Y i}. Thus we have to use larger and larger slices of Y which
actually waste some entropy. Instead, we can use several parts of X, each with O(log(1/ǫ)) uniform
bits. For example, suppose that we have obtained X1 and X2, where each is uniform on some
O(log(1/ǫ)) bits and X2 is uniform even conditioned on the fixing of (X1,X ′1). We can now take
some t slices {Y i} of Y , each of length (2i − 1) · 2d for some parameters t, d. We first use X1 to
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extract from each Y i and obtain d uniform bits. Note that conditioned on the fixing of (X1,X ′1),
these t random variables already satisfy the look-ahead property. Now for each of these d bits
obtained from Y i, we can apply the same process, i.e., we take some t slices of these d bits, each of
length (2i − 1) ·O(log(1/ǫ)) and then use X2 to extract from each of them. This way we obtain t2
random variables {Yi} that satisfy the look-ahead property. We can thus choose t2 = 2ℓ which means
t = O(
√
ℓ). The entropy requirement of Y is roughly (2t−1)·(2t−1)O(log(1/ǫ)) = O(22t log(1/ǫ)) =
2O(
√
ℓ) log(1/ǫ), while the entropy requirement for X is 2 ·O(log(1/ǫ))+O(log(1/ǫ)) = O(log(1/ǫ)).
This significantly improves the entropy requirement of Y .
We can repeat the previous process and use some a parts (X1, · · · ,Xa) obtained from X. As
long as a is a constant, X only needs entropy O(a log(1/ǫ)) = O(log(1/ǫ)), while the entropy
requirement of Y is reduced to 2O(aℓ
1
a ) log(1/ǫ) = 2O(alog log(1/ǫ)
1
a ) log(1/ǫ). To prepare the a parts
of X, we perform an initial alternating extraction between X and Y , which only needs entropy
O(a log(1/ǫ)) from either of them. This gives Theorem 1.6. In the extreme case, we can try to
minimize the entropy requirement of Y by first creating log ℓ+1 = log log log(1/ǫ)+O(1) Xi’s, and
in each step using a new Xi to double the number of Yi’s. This can be done by using the same X
i
to do an alternating extraction of two rounds with each Yi in parallel. Thus after log ℓ+1 steps we
obtain (Y1, · · · , Y2ℓ). Now X needs to have entropy O(log(1/ǫ) log log log(1/ǫ)). Ideally, we would
want to claim that Y needs entropy O(log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)), but due to technical reasons we can
only show that this works as long as Y has entropy O(log(1/ǫ)(log log(1/ǫ))2).
The balanced case. In the above discussion, the entropy requirement forX and Y is unbalanced,
in the sense that one of them can be quite small, while the other is relatively large. For applications
to two-source extractors and non-malleable codes, we need a balanced entropy requirement. Upon
first look it does not seem that our new techniques can achieve any improvement in this case,
since we are still merging two rows of the matrix V in each step, and for this merging we need at
least Ω(log(1/ǫ)) fresh random bits. Note that we need ℓ = logL = log log(1/ǫ) steps to finish the
merging, thus it seems the total entropy requirement is at least Ω(log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)).
Our key observation here is that we can again apply the idea of recycling entropy. Specifically,
let us choose a parameter t ∈ N and we merge every t rows in the matrix V at each step, using some
merger that we have developed above. For example, we can choose the merger which for merging
t rows, requires X to have entropy O(log(1/ǫ)) and Y to have entropy 2O(
√
log t) log(1/ǫ). This
will take us logLlog t steps to finish merging, and we will do it in the following way. First, we create
s = O( logLlog t ) random variables X1, · · · ,Xs that satisfy the look-ahead property. Then, in each step
of the merging, we will use a new Xj. The Xj’s can be prepared by taking a small slice of both
X and Y and do an alternating extraction protocol with O(s) rounds, which consumes entropy
O(s log(1/ǫ)) = O( logLlog t log(1/ǫ)) from both X and Y . However, in each step of the merging, we
will not use fresh entropy from Y , but will recycle the entropy in Y . Note that by doing this, we
are recycling the entropy in both X and Y . The recycling in X is done within each step of applying
the small merger, while the recycling in Y is done between these steps.
Now, consider a particular step i in the merging. Since we are using a new Xj in each step,
we can fix all previous Xj ’s that have been used and their tampered versions. Conditioned on this
fixing, the matrix V obtained so far (and the tampered version V ′) is a deterministic function of Y ,
therefore independent of X. We now want to claim that conditioned on the random variable (V, V ′),
Y still has high entropy. If this is true then we can take a new Xj+1 and apply a strong seeded
extractor to Y using Xj+1 as the seed, and the extracted random bits (which are deterministic
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functions of Y conditioned on the fixing of Xj+1) can be used for merging in the next step. Also
note that to apply the merger, we can take yet another new Xj+2 and use each row of V to extract
from Xj+2 and create a matrix W . Conditioned on the fixing of (V, V
′), we have that (W,W ′) is a
deterministic function of (X,X ′) and therefore independent of (Y, Y ′). Moreover the independence
between corresponding rows in (V, V ′) is preserved in (W,W ′) (i.e., there is also a row in W that
is uniform given the corresponding row in W ′). Thus now we can indeed apply the merger again
to W and the extracted random bits from Y , possibly together with a new Xj+3. Again, this is
similar in spirit to what has been done in previous constructions of pseudorandom generators for
small space computation [Nis92, NZ96].
The above idea indeed works, except for the following subtle point: in the first several steps of
merging, the matrix V can have many rows and the size of V can be larger than the entropy of Y ,
unless Y has entropy Ω(log2(1/ǫ)). Thus conditioning on (V, V ′) may cause Y to lose all entropy.
To get around this, we again use the fact that we only need one row in V to be independent of the
corresponding row in V ′ (call this the good row), and does not care about the dependence between
different rows. Thus in each step, we only need to condition on the fixing of the t rows that we are
merging (and their tampered versions). This ensures that if originally there is a good row in these
t rows, then after merging the output is also a good row in the new matrix. Thus, we only need the
entropy of Y to beO(t log(1/ǫ))+2O(
√
log t) log(1/ǫ)+O( logLlog t log(1/ǫ)) = O(t log(1/ǫ)+
logL
log t log(1/ǫ))
since we will maintain the length of each row in V to be O(log(1/ǫ)). Now by choosing t = logLlog logL ,
both X and Y only need entropy O( logLlog logL log(1/ǫ)) = O(
log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)
log log log(1/ǫ) ). By the connections in
[Li17, BADTS17, CG14b], this dependence gives Theorem 1.11, 1.12, 1.13 and 1.16.
Non-malleable codes. To further improve the rate of non-malleable codes in the 2-split state
model, we re-examine the connection between non-malleable codes and non-malleable two-source
extractors found by Cheraghchi and Guruswami [CG14b]. They showed that given a non-malleable
two-source extractor with error ǫ and output length m, the uniform sampling of the pre-image of
any given output gives an encoding of a non-malleable code in the 2-split state model with error
roughly 2mǫ. This blow up of error comes from the conditioning on the event that the output of
the extractor is a given string in {0, 1}m, which roughly has probability 2−m. Therefore, one needs
m < log(1/ǫ), and thus the error of the extractor puts a limit on the rate of the code.
To break this barrier, we note that all recent constructions of non-malleable two-source extrac-
tors [CGL16, Li17] follow a very special framework. As mentioned before, these constructions first
obtain an advice α˜ such that with probability 1 − ǫ1 we have α˜ 6= α˜′, where α˜′ is the tampered
version. Then, using a correlation breaker with advice one obtains the output. This part has error
ǫ2, and the final error of the extractor is ǫ1 + ǫ2.
In all previous work, this error is treated as a whole, but our key observation here is that these
two errors ǫ1 and ǫ2 can actually be treated separately. More specifically, the error that matters
most for the rate of the code is actually ǫ2, not ǫ1. Intuitively, this is because the event α˜ 6= α˜′
is determined by a set of random variables that have small size compared to the length of X and
Y . Thus even conditioned on the fixing of these random variables, X and Y still have plenty of
entropy, which implies that the output of the extractor is still ǫ2-close to uniform. Thus, as long
as ǫ2 is small, the output of the extractor is roughly independent of the event α˜ 6= α˜′. Therefore,
conditioned on any given output of the extractor, the event α˜ 6= α˜′ still happens with probability
roughly 1−ǫ1 and we won’t be paying a price of 2mǫ1 here. Once this event happens, the correlation
breaker ensures that the extractor is non-malleable with error ǫ2, and we can use a similar argument
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as in [CG14b] to get a non-malleable code with error roughly 2mǫ2. Thus the total error of the
non-malleable code is roughly ǫ1 + 2
mǫ2. Now, we just need m < log(1/ǫ2).
We can now play with the two parameters ǫ1, ǫ2. The advice length L is Ω(log(1/ǫ1)) and we
need to supply entropy O( logLlog logL log(1/ǫ2)) by using our improved correlation breaker. If we can
achieve L = Θ(log(1/ǫ1)) then one can see that if we choose ǫ1 to be any constant, then we can
set ǫ2 = 2
−Ω(n) and also m = Ω(n), thus we get a constant rate non-malleable code. If we set
ǫ1 = 2
−polylog(n) then we can set ǫ2 = 2
−Ω(n log log log n
log log n
)
and thus we get rate Ω( log log lognlog logn ).
A technical issue here is how to achieve L = Θ(log(1/ǫ1)) for any ǫ1. In [CGL16, Li17], the ad-
vice is obtained by using some random seed R to sample from an asymptotically good encoding of
X,Y , and concatenating the sampled symbols with R. This puts a lower bound of log n on L, since
we need at least this number of bits to sample from a string of length n. However this is not good
enough to achieve constant rate. Our idea around this is to use repeated sampling. To illustrate the
idea, suppose for example that we have obtained an advice V such that V 6= V ′ with probability
1 − 1/poly(n) and V has length O(log n). We now use another piece of independent random bits
R1 of length O(log log n) to sample O(log log n) bits from an asymptotically good encoding of V ,
and obtain a new advice V1 by concatenating R1 with the sample bits. This ensures that V1 6= V ′1
happens with probability 1 − 1/polylog(n) conditioned on V 6= V ′, and the length of V1 is now
O(log log n). We repeat this process until we get the desired error ǫ1 (e.g., a constant) and the
advice length is now L = Θ(log(1/ǫ1)). Note that the total error is still O(ǫ1), the total number
of random bits needed is small, and the process terminates in roughly log∗ n steps. To prepare the
independent random bits used in repeated sampling, we first take a small slice of X and Y and do
an alternating extraction with roughly log∗ n steps, which guarantees the bits used for sampling in
later steps are independent of the previous ones and their tampered versions. Finally, some extra
work are needed here to take care of the issue of fixed points, which is more subtle than [CG14b]
since now we are treating the two errors ǫ1 and ǫ2 separately.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We give some preliminaries in
Section 2, and define alternating extraction in Section 3. We present independence preserving
mergers in Section 4, correlation breakers in Section 5, non-malleable extractors in Section 6, and
non-malleable codes in Section 7. Finally we conclude with some open problems in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
We often use capital letters for random variables and corresponding small letters for their instanti-
ations. Let |S| denote the cardinality of the set S. For ℓ a positive integer, Uℓ denotes the uniform
distribution on {0, 1}ℓ. When used as a component in a vector, each Uℓ is assumed independent of
the other components. When we have adversarial tampering, we use letters with prime to denote
the tampered version of random variables. All logarithms are to the base 2.
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2.1 Probability Distributions
Definition 2.1 (statistical distance). LetW and Z be two distributions on a set S. Their statistical
distance (variation distance) is
∆(W,Z)
def
= max
T⊆S
(|W (T )− Z(T )|) = 1
2
∑
s∈S
|W (s)− Z(s)|.
We say W is ε-close to Z, denoted W ≈ε Z, if ∆(W,Z) ≤ ε. For a distribution D on a set S
and a function h : S → T , let h(D) denote the distribution on T induced by choosing x according
to D and outputting h(x).
Lemma 2.2. For any function α and two random variables A,B, we have ∆(α(A), α(B)) ≤
∆(A,B).
2.2 Average Conditional Min Entropy
Definition 2.3. The average conditional min-entropy is defined as
H˜∞(X|W ) = − log
(
Ew←W
[
max
x
Pr[X = x|W = w]
])
= − log
(
Ew←W
[
2−H∞(X|W=w)
])
.
Lemma 2.4 ([DORS08]). For any s > 0, Prw←W [H∞(X|W = w) ≥ H˜∞(X|W )− s] ≥ 1− 2−s.
Lemma 2.5 ([DORS08]). If a random variable B has at most 2ℓ possible values, then H˜∞(A|B) ≥
H∞(A)− ℓ.
2.3 Prerequisites from Previous Work
Sometimes it is convenient to talk about average case seeded extractors, where the source X has
average conditional min-entropy H˜∞(X|Z) ≥ k and the output of the extractor should be uniform
given Z as well. The following lemma is proved in [DORS08].
Lemma 2.6. [DORS08] For any δ > 0, if Ext is a (k, ǫ) extractor then it is also a (k+log(1/δ), ǫ+δ)
average case extractor.
For a strong seeded extractor with optimal parameters, we use the following extractor con-
structed in [GUV09].
Theorem 2.7 ([GUV09]). For every constant α > 0, there exists a constant β > 0 such that for all
positive integers n, k and any ǫ > 2−βk, there is an explicit construction of a strong (k, ǫ)-extractor
Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n + log(1/ǫ)) and m ≥ (1 − α)k. The same
statement also holds for a strong average case extractor.
Theorem 2.8 ([CG88]). For every 0 < m < n there is an explicit two-source extractor IP : {0, 1}n×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m based on the inner product function, such that if X,Y are two independent (n, k1)
and (n, k2) sources respectively, then
(IP(X,Y ),X) ≈ǫ (Um,X) and (IP(X,Y ), Y ) ≈ǫ (Um, Y ),
where ǫ = 2−
k1+k2−n−m−1
2 .
The following standard lemma about conditional min-entropy is implicit in [NZ96] and explicit
in [MW97].
Lemma 2.9 ([MW97]). Let X and Y be random variables and let Y denote the range of Y . Then
for all ǫ > 0, one has
Pr
Y
[
H∞(X|Y = y) ≥ H∞(X) − log |Y| − log
(
1
ǫ
)]
≥ 1− ǫ.
We also need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.10. [Li13a] Let (X,Y ) be a joint distribution such that X has range X and Y has
range Y. Assume that there is another random variable X ′ with the same range as X such that
|X −X ′| = ǫ. Then there exists a joint distribution (X ′, Y ) such that |(X,Y )− (X ′, Y )| = ǫ.
3 Alternating Extraction
Our constructions use the following alternating extraction protocol as a key ingredient. Alternating
extraction was first introduced in [DP07], and has now become an important tool in constructions
related to extractors.
Quentin: Q,S1 Wendy: X
S1
S1−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R1←−−−−−−−−−−−−− R1 = Extw(X,S1)
S2 = Extq(Q,R1)
S2−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
R2←−−−−−−−−−−−−− R2 = Extw(X,S2)
· · ·
Sℓ = Extq(Q,Rℓ−1)
Sℓ−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Rℓ = Extw(X,Sℓ)
Figure 1: Alternating Extraction.
Definition 3.1. (Alternating Extraction) Assume that we have two parties, Quentin and Wendy.
Quentin has a source Q, Wendy has a source W . Also assume that Quentin has a uniform random
seed S1 (which may be correlated with Q). Suppose that (Q,S1) is kept secret from Wendy and W
is kept secret from Quentin. Let Extq, Extw be strong seeded extractors with optimal parameters,
such as that in Theorem 2.7. Let r, s be two integer parameters for the protocol. For some integer
parameter ℓ > 0, the alternating extraction protocol is an interactive process between Quentin and
Wendy that runs in ℓ steps.
In the first step, Quentin sends S1 to Wendy, Wendy computes R1 = Extw(W,S1). She sends
R1 to Quentin and Quentin computes S2 = Extq(Q,R1). In this step R1, S2 each outputs r and
s bits respectively. In each subsequent step i, Quentin sends Si to Wendy, Wendy computes
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Ri = Extw(W,Si). She replies Ri to Quentin and Quentin computes Si+1 = Extq(Q,Ri). In step
i, Ri, Si+1 each outputs r and s bits respectively. Therefore, this process produces the following
sequence:
S1, R1 = Extw(W,S1), S2 = Extq(Q,R1), · · · ,
Sℓ = Extq(Q,Rℓ−1), Rℓ = Extw(W,Sℓ).
The output of an alternating extraction protocol is often described as a look-ahead extractor,
defined as follows. Let Y = (Q,S1) be a seed, the look-ahead extractor is defined as
laExt(W,Y ) = laExt(W, (Q,S1))
def
= R1, · · · , Rℓ.
The following lemma is a special case of Lemma 6.5 in [CGL16].
Lemma 3.2. Let W be an (nw, kw)-source and W
′ be a random variable on {0, 1}nw that is ar-
bitrarily correlated with W . Let Y = (Q,S1) such that Q is a (nq, kq)-source, S1 is a uniform
string on s bits, and Y ′ = (Q′, S′1) be a random variable arbitrarily correlated with Y , where Q
′
and S′1 are random variables on nq bits and s bits respectively. Let Extq,Extw be strong seeded
extractors that extract s and r bits from sources with min-entropy k with error ǫ and seed length
d ≤ min{r, s}. Suppose (Y, Y ′) is independent of (W,W ′), kq > k + 2(ℓ − 1)s + 2 log(1ǫ ), and
kw > k + 2(ℓ− 1)r + 2 log(1ǫ ). Let laExt be the look-ahead extractor defined above using Extq,Extw,
and (R1, · · · , Rℓ) = laExt(W,Y ), (R′1, · · · , R′ℓ) = laExt(W ′, Y ′). Then for any 0 ≤ j ≤ ℓ − 1, we
have
(Y, Y ′, {R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, Rj+1)
≈ǫ1(Y, Y ′, {R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, Ur),
where ǫ1 = O(ℓǫ).
4 Non-Malleable Independence Preserving Merger
We now describe the notion of non-malleable independence preserving merger, introduced in [CL16]
based on the notion of independence preserving merger introduced in [CS16].
Definition 4.1. A (L, d′, ε)-NIPM : {0, 1}Lm × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m1 satisfies the following property.
Suppose
• X,X′ are random variables, each supported on boolean L ×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [L],
Xi = Um,
• {Y,Y′} is independent of {X,X′}, s.t Y,Y′ are each supported on {0, 1}d and H∞(Y) > d′,
• there exists an h ∈ [L] such that (Xh,X′h) = (Um,X′h),
then
|(L, d′, ε)-NIPM(X,Y), (L, d′, ε)-NIPM(X′,Y′)
− Um1 , (L, d′, ε)-NIPM(X′,Y′)| 6 ǫ.
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We have the following construction and theorem.
L-Alternating ExtractionWe extend the previous alternating extraction protocol by letting
Quentin have access to L sources Q1, . . . , QL (instead of just Q) which have the same length. Now
in the i’th round of the protocol, he uses Qi to produce the r.v Si = Extq(Qi, Ri). More formally,
the following sequence of r.v’s is generated: S1, R1 = Extw(W,S1), S2 = Extq(Q2, R1), . . . , RL−1 =
Extw(W,Sℓ−1), SL = Extq(QL, RL−1).
The NIPM is now constructed as follows. Let S1 be a slice of X1 with length O(log(d/ε)), then
run the L-alternating extraction described above with (Q1, . . . , QL) = (X1, . . . ,XL) and W = Y.
Finally output SL.
Theorem 4.2 ([CL16]). There exists a constant c > 0 such that for all integers m,d, d′, L > 0 and
any ǫ > 0, with m > 4cL log(d/ǫ), d′ > 4cL log(m/ǫ), the above construction NIPM : ({0, 1}m)ℓ ×
{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m1 has output length m1 ≥ 0.2m, such that if the following conditions hold:
• X,X′ are random variables, each supported on boolean L ×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [L],
Xi = Um,
• {Y,Y′} is independent of {X,X′}, s.t Y,Y′ are each supported on {0, 1}d and H∞(Y) > d′,
• there exists an h ∈ [L] such that (Xh,X′h) = (Um,X′h),
then
|NIPM(X,Y),NIPM(X′,Y′),Y,Y′ − Um1 ,NIPM(X′,Y′),Y,Y′| 6 Lǫ.
It is sometimes more convenient to consider NIPMs which use an additional source X in the
computation. We generalize the above definition as follows.
Definition 4.3. A (L, d, d′, ε)-NIPM : {0, 1}Lm×{0, 1}d×{0, 1}d′ → {0, 1}m1 satisfies the following
property. Suppose
• V, V ′ are random variables, each supported on boolean L ×m matrices s.t for any i ∈ [L],
Vi = Um,
• there exists an h ∈ [L] such that (Vh, V ′h) = (Um, V ′h),
• X,X′ are random variables, each supported on d bits, such that X is uniform conditioned on
(V, V ′),
• (Y,Y′) is independent of (V, V ′,X,X′), s.t Y,Y′ are each supported on {0, 1}d′ and Y is
uniform,
If the function is an NIPM that is strong in Y then
|(L, d, d′, ε)-NIPM(V,X,Y), (L, d, d′ , ε)-NIPM(V ′,X′,Y′),Y,Y′
− Um1 , (L, d, d′, ε)-NIPM(V ′,X′,Y′),Y,Y′| 6 ǫ.
If the function is an NIPM that is strong in X then
|(L, d, d′, ε)-NIPM(V,X,Y), (L, d, d′, ε)-NIPM(V ′,X′,Y′),X,X′
− Um1 , (L, d, d′, ε)-NIPM(V ′,X′,Y′),X,X′| 6 ǫ.
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We will now use the above construction to give another NIPM, which recycles the entropy.
Specifically, we have the following construction.
Construction 4.4. Asymmetric NIPM.
Inputs:
• L,m, n, d ∈ N and an error parameter ǫ > 0 such that m ≥ c log(d/ǫ) and d ≥ c log(n/ǫ) for
some constant c > 1.
• A random variable V supported on a boolean L×m matrix.
• An (n, 6m) source X.
• Random variables Y1, · · · ,Yℓ where ℓ = logL and each Yi is supported on {0, 1}d.
Output: a random variable W ∈ {0, 1}m.
Let V 0 = V . For i = 1 to logL do the following.
1. Take a slice Y1i of Yi with length d/3. Merge every two rows of V
i−1, using Y1i and the
NIPM from Theorem 4.2. That is, for every j ≤ t/2 where t is the current number of rows in
V i−1 (initially t = L), compute V i−1j = NIPM((V
i−1
2j−1, V
i−1
2j ),Y
1
i ).
2. For every j ≤ t/2, compute Yij = Ext1(Yi, V i−1j ), where Ext1 is the extractor in Theorem 2.7
and output d/4 bits.
3. For every i ≤ t/2, compute ˜V i−1j = Ext2(X,Yij), where Ext2 is the extractor in Theorem 2.7
and output m bits.
4. Let V i with the concatenation of ˜V i−1j , j = 1, · · · , t/2. Note that the number of rows in V i
has decreased by a factor of 2.
Finally output W = V logL.
Lemma 4.5. There is a constant c > 1 such that suppose we have the following random variables:
• V, V ′, each supported on a boolean L ×m matrix s.t for any i ∈ [L], Vi = Um. In addition,
there exists an h ∈ [L] such that (Vh, V ′h) = (Um, V ′h).
• X,X′ where X is an (n, 6m) source.
• Random variables (Y1,Y′1), · · · , (Yℓ,Y′ℓ) obtained from Y,Y′ deterministically, where ℓ =
logL. These random variables satisfy the following look-ahead condition: ∀j < ℓ, we have
(Yj ,Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yj−1,Y′j−1) = (Ud,Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Yj−1,Y′j−1).
In addition, (V, V ′,X,X′) is independent of (Y,Y′).
Let W be the output of the NIPM on (V,X,Y1, · · · ,Yℓ) and W′ be the output of the NIPM on
(V ′,X′,Y′1, · · · ,Y′ℓ). Then
(W,W′,Y,Y′) ≈O(Lǫ) (Um,W′,Y,Y′).
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Proof. We use induction to show the following claim.
Claim 4.6. For every 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ = logL, the following holds after step i.
• V i, V ′i are each supported on boolean (t = L/2i)×m matrices s.t for any j ∈ [t], (V ij ,Y,Y′) ≈ǫj
(Um,Y,Y
′). In addition, there exists an h ∈ [t] such that (V ih, V ′ih ,Y,Y′) ≈ǫi (Um, V ′ih ,Y,Y′).
Here ǫi is the error after step i which satisfies that ǫ0 = 0 and ǫi+1 ≤ 2ǫi + 4ǫ.
• Conditioned on the fixing of Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Yj ,Y′j , each of V i and V ′i is a deterministic function
of V, V ′,X,X′.
For the base case of i = 0, the claim clearly holds. Now assume that the claim holds for i, we
show that it holds for i+ 1.
We first fix Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yi,Y′i. By the induction hypothesis, conditioned on the fixing of
these random variables, each of V i and V ′i is a deterministic function of V, V ′,X,X′, and thus
independent of (Yi+1,Y
′
i+1). We only consider the row h ∈ [t] such that (Vh, V ′h) ≈4·2iǫ (Um, V ′h),
since the analysis for the rest of the rows are similar and simpler.
First we ignore the error ǫi. By Theorem 4.2, and note that we are merging every two rows at
one step, we can choose a suitable constant c > 1 in the construction such that
(V ih′ , V
′i
h′ ,Y
1
i+1,Y
′1
i+1) ≈2ǫ (Um1 , V ′ih′ ,Y1i+1,Y′1i+1),
where h′ = ⌈h2 ⌉ and m1 = 0.2m. We now fix (Y1i+1,Y′1i+1). Note that conditioned on the
fixing, Yi+1 still has average conditional min-entropy at least d−d/3 = 2d/3 and is independent of
(V ih′ , V
′i
h′). Now we can first fix V
′i
h′ and then Y
′
ih′ . Note that conditioned on this fixing, V
i
h′ is still
(close to) uniform and the average conditional min-entropy of Yi+1 is at least 2d/3 − d/4 > d/3.
Thus as long as c is large enough, by Theorem 2.7 we have that
(Yih′ , V
i
h′) ≈ǫ (Ud/4, V ih′).
We now further fix V ih′ . Note that conditioned on this fixing, Yih′ is still (close to) uniform.
Moreover conditioned on all the random variables we have fixed, Yih′ is a deterministic function
of Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yi+1,Y′i+1 and thus independent of X,X′. Also conditioned on all the random
variables we have fixed, the average conditional min-entropy of X is at least 6m− 2m1 > 5m.
We can now further fix V˜ ′ih′ , which is a deterministic function of X
′. Conditioned on this fixing
the independence of random variables still holds, while the average conditional min-entropy of X
is at least 5m−m = 4m. Therefore by Theorem 2.7 we have that
(V˜ ih′ ,Yih′) ≈ǫ (Um,Yih′).
Since we have already fixed Y′ih′ and V˜
′i
h′ , and note that conditioned on this fixing, (Y,Y
′) are
independent of V˜ ih′ which is a deterministic function of X, we also have that
(V˜ ih′ , X˜
′
h′ ,Y,Y
′) ≈ǫ (Um, X˜′h′ ,Y,Y′).
Adding back all the errors we get that there exists an h′ ∈ [t] such that
(X˜h′ , V˜
′i
h′ ,Y,Y
′) ≈ǫi+1 (Um, V˜ ′ih′ ,Y,Y′),
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where ǫi+1 ≤ 2ǫi+4ǫ. Furthermore, it is clear that conditioned on the fixing ofY1,Y′1, · · · ,Yi+1,Y′i+1,
each of V i+1 and V ′i+1 is a deterministic function of V, V ′,X,X′.
We can now estimate the final error to be ǫℓ ≤ 4(
∑ℓ
i=1 2
iǫ) = O(Lǫ). Finally, when the number
or rows in V i decreases to 1 after step ℓ, the output W = V logL satisfies the conclusion of the
lemma.
We will now construct another NIPM. First we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.7. For any constant a ∈ N, any ℓ, s ∈ N and any ǫ > 0 there exists an explicit function
Conva : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}a·d → {0, 1}ℓ·s with d = O(log(n/ǫ)) and n = 2O(a·ℓ
1
a ) · s such that the
following holds. Let (Y, Y ′) be two random variables each on n bits, and Y is uniform. Let (X =
(X1, · · · ,Xa),X ′ = (X ′1, · · · ,X ′a)) be random variables each on a · d bits, where each Xi and X ′i is
on d bits. Further assume that (X,X ′) satisfies the following look-ahead property: ∀i ∈ [a], we have
(Xi,X1,X
′
1, · · · ,Xi−1,X ′i−1) = (Ud,X1,X ′1, · · · ,Xi−1,X ′i−1).
Let (W1, · · · ,Wℓ) = Conva(Y,X) and (W ′1, · · · ,W ′ℓ) = Conva(Y ′,X ′). Then we have
(X,X ′,W1,W ′1, · · · ,Wℓ,W ′ℓ) ≈O(ℓǫ) (X,X ′, Us,W ′1, · · · , Us,W ′ℓ),
where each Us is independent of previous random variables but may depend on later random
variables.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction on a. For the base case a = 1, consider the following
construction. For j = 1, · · · , ℓ, let Yj be a slice of Y with length (2j − 1) · 2s (this is possible since
the total entropy required is at most 2ℓ · 2s), and compute Wj = Ext(Yj ,X1). Note that for any
j ∈ [ℓ], conditioned on the fixing of Y1, Y ′1 , · · · , Yj−1, Y ′j−1, the average conditional min-entropy of
Yj is at least (2
j − 1) · 2s− 2(2j−1 − 1) · 2s = 2s. Thus by Theorem 2.7 we have that
(Wj , Y1, Y
′
1 , · · · , Yj−1, Y ′j−1,X,X ′) ≈ǫ (Us, Y1, Y ′1 , · · · , Yj−1, Y ′j−1,X,X ′).
Since (W1,W
′
1, · · · ,Wj−1,W ′j−1) is a deterministic function of (Y1, Y ′1 , · · · , Yj−1, Y ′j−1) and (X,X ′),
we also have that
(Wj ,W1,W
′
1, · · · ,Wj−1,W ′j−1,X,X ′) ≈ǫ (Us,W1,W ′1, · · · ,Wj−1,W ′j−1,W,W ′).
By adding all the errors the statement of the lemma holds.
Now assume that the lemma holds for a, we will construct another function Conva+1 for the
case of a + 1. First choose a parameter t ∈ N to be decided later. For j = 1, · · · , ℓ/t, let Yj be a
slice of Y with length (2j − 1) · 2m, where m is the length of Y (i.e., n) for Conva when choosing
ℓ = t. Thus we have m = 2O(a·t
1
a ) ·s. Now, for every j we first use X1 to compute Wˆj = Ext(Yj,X1)
and output m bits, then compute (Wˆ1j , · · · , Wˆtj) = Conva(Wˆj ,X2, · · · ,Xa+1). The final outputs
are obtained by combining all the {Wˆij} in sequence.
Note that by the same argument as above, we have that
(X1,X
′
1, Wˆ1, Wˆ
′
1, · · · , Wˆℓ/t, Wˆ ′ℓ/t) ≈O( ℓ
t
ǫ) (X1,X
′
1, Um, Wˆ
′
1, · · · , Um, Wˆ ′ℓ/t).
Now we can fix (X1,X
′
1). Note that conditioned on the fixing, (Wˆ1, Wˆ
′
1, · · · , Wˆℓ/t, Wˆ ′ℓ/t) is
a deterministic function of (Y, Y ′), thus independent of (X,X ′). Now we can used the induction
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hypothesis to conclude that the statement holds for the case of a+ 1. Note that the total error is
O( ℓt ǫ) + ℓ/t ·O(tǫ) = O(ℓǫ) since the part of O( ℓt ǫ) decreases as a geometric sequence. Finally, the
entropy requirement of Y is (2ℓ/t − 1) · 2m = (2ℓ/t − 1) · 2 · 2O(a·t
1
a ) · s = 2l/t+O(a·t
1
a )+1 · s.
We now just need to choose a t to minimize this quantity. We can choose t = ℓ
a
a+1 so that the
entropy requirement of Y is 2O((a+1)·ℓ
1
a+1 ) · s.
We now have the following construction.
Construction 4.8. NIPMx (which is strong in Y ) or NIPMy (which is strong in X).
Inputs:
• An error parameter ǫ > 0 and a constant a ∈ N.
• A random variable V supported on a boolean L×m matrix.
• A uniform string X on d1 bits.
• A uniform string Y on d2 bits.
• Let d = c log(max{d1, d2}/ǫ) for some constant c > 1.
Output: NIPMx outputs a random variable Wx ∈ {0, 1}m, and NIPMy outputs Wy ∈ {0, 1}d.
1. Let ℓ = logL.5 Let X0 be a slice of X with length 4a · d, and Y0 be a slice of Y with length
4a · d. Use X0 and Y0 to run an alternating extraction protocol, and output (R0, · · · , Ra) =
laExt(X0, Y0) where each Ri has d bits.
2. Compute Z = Ext(Y,R0) and output d2/2 bits, where Ext is the strong seeded extractor from
Theorem 2.7.
3. For every i ∈ [L], compute Vi = Ext(Y0, Vi) and output d bits. Then, compute Vˆi = Ext(X,Vi)
and output m bits.
4. Compute (Z1, · · · , Zℓ) = Conva(Z,R1, · · · , Ra) where each Zi has d bits.
5. NIPMx outputs Wx = NIPM(Vˆ , Z1, · · · , Zℓ), where NIPM is the merger in Construction 4.4
and Lemma 4.5. NIPMy outputs Wy = Ext(Y,Wx) with d bits.
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.9. There exist a constant c > 1 such that for any ǫ > 0 and any L,m, d1, d2, n ∈ N such
that d ≥ c(logmax{d1, d2} + log(1/ǫ)), m ≥ d, d1 ≥ 8a · d + 6m and d2 ≥ 8a · d + ca·log
1
a L · d, the
above construction gives an (L, d1, d2, O(Lǫ))-NIPM that is either strong in X or strong in Y .
5Without loss of generality we assume that L is a power of 2. Otherwise add 0 to the string until the length is a
power of 2.
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Proof. Note that Y0 has min-entropy 4ad ≥ 4d, thus by Theorem 2.7 we have that for every i ∈ [L],
(Vi, Vi) ≈ǫ (Ud, Vi),
and there exists an h ∈ [L] such that
(Vh, V
′
h, Vh, V
′
h) ≈ǫ (Ud, V ′h, Vh, V ′h).
Note that conditioned on the fixing of (V, V ′), we have that (X,X ′) and (Y, Y ′) are still indepen-
dent, and furthermore (V , V ′) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y ′). Note that conditioned on the
fixing of (X0,X
′
0), the average conditional min-entropy of X is at least 8a · d+6m− 2 · 4a · d = 6m.
Thus again by Theorem 2.7 we have that for every i ∈ [L],
(Vˆi, Vi) ≈ǫ (Ud, Vi),
and there exists an h ∈ [L] such that
(Vˆh, Vˆ ′h, Vh, V ′h) ≈ǫ (Ud, Vˆ ′h, Vh, V ′h).
Note that now conditioned on the fixing of (Vh, V
′
h), we have that (X,X
′) and (Y, Y ′) are still
independent, and furthermore (Vˆh, Vˆ ′h) is a deterministic function of (X,X ′). Thus we basically
have that conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X
′
0, Y0, Y
′
0), (Vˆ , Vˆ
′) is a deterministic function of (X,X ′)
and they satisfy the property needed by an NIPM.
Now, by Lemma 3.2, we have that
(Y0, Y
′
0 , R0, R
′
0, · · · , Ra, R′a) ≈O(a2ǫ) (Y0, Y ′0 , Ud, R′0, · · · , Ud, R′a).
Note that conditioned on the fixing of (Y0, Y
′
0), we have that (X,X
′) and (Y, Y ′) are still
independent, and furthermore (R0, R
′
0, · · · , Ra, R′a) is a deterministic function of (X,X ′). Also the
average conditional min-entropy of Y is at least d2 − 2 · 4a · d = ca·log
1
a L · d > 3d2/4 for a large
enough constant c. Thus by Theorem 2.7 we have that
(Z,R0) ≈ǫ (Ud2/2, R0).
We can now fix (R0, R0). Note that now (Z0, Z
′
0) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y
′), and
d2/2 >
1
2c
a·log 1a L · d. Note that now (R1, R′1, · · · , Ra, R′a) still satisfies the look-ahead property.
Thus as long as c is large enough, by Lemma 4.7 we have that
(Z1, Z
′
1, · · · , Zℓ, Z ′ℓ,X0,X ′0) ≈O(ℓǫ) (Ud,W ′1, · · · , Ud,W ′ℓ,X0,X ′0).
We can now fix (X0,X
′
0), and note that conditioned on this fixing (Z1, Z
′
1, · · · , Zℓ, Z ′ℓ) is a
deterministic function of (Y, Y ′). In summary, conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X ′0, Y0, Y
′
0), we have
that (Vˆ , Vˆ ′)and (Z1, Z ′1, · · · , Zℓ, Z ′ℓ) satisfy the conditions required by Lemma 4.5. Therefore we can
now apply that lemma to finish the proof. The total error is at most O(Lǫ)+O(a2ǫ)+O(ǫ)+O(ℓǫ) =
O(Lǫ).
The extreme case of the above construction gives the following NIPM.
Construction 4.10. NIPMx (which is strong in Y ) or NIPMy (which is strong in X).
Inputs:
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• An error parameter ǫ > 0.
• A random variable V supported on a boolean L×m matrix.
• A uniform string X on n bits.
• A uniform string Y on n′ bits.
Output: NIPMx outputs a random variableWx ∈ {0, 1}m, and NIPMy outputsWy ∈ {0, 1}O(log(n/ǫ)).
1. Let d1 = c log(n
′/ǫ) and d2 = c log(n/ǫ). Take a slice X0 of X with length 10 log logL · d1,
and a slice Y0 of Y with length 10 log logL · d2.
2. Use X0 and Y0 to do an alternating extraction protocol, and output (R0, R1, · · · , Rt) =
laExt(X0,Y0) where t = log logL and each Ri has 4d1 bits, each Si (used in the alternating
extraction) has d2 bits.
3. For each i ∈ [L], compute Yi = Ext(Y0, Vi) where each Yi outputs d2 bits. Then compute
V i = Ext(X,Yi) where each V i outputs m bits. Here Ext is the strong seeded extractor from
Theorem 2.7. Let V be the matrix whose i’th row is V i.
4. Let Y01 = Y. For j = 0 to log logL do the following. For h = 1 to 2
j , use Yjh and Rj
to do an alternating extraction protocol, and output (Sjh1, S
j
h2) = laExt(Y
j
h, Rj), where each
Sjhi has (
loglog a L
aj−1
− 1)d2 bits. Note that altogether we get 2j+1 outputs and relabel them as
Y
j+1
1 , · · · ,Yj+12j+1 .
5. After the previous step, we get 2 logL outputs. Let them be Y1, · · · ,Y2 logL, and output
Wx = NIPM(V ,X,Y1, · · · ,Y2 logL) with m bits. Let Wy = Ext(Y,Wx) with d2 bits.
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. There is a constant c > 1 such that suppose we have the following random variables
and conditions:
• V, V ′, each supported on a boolean L ×m matrix s.t for any i ∈ [L], Vi = Um. In addition,
there exists an h ∈ [L] such that (Vh, V ′h) = (Um, V ′h).
• Y,Y′, each supported on n′ bits, where Y is uniform.
• X,X′, each supported on n bits, where X is uniform. In addition, X is independent of (V, V ′),
and (V, V ′,X,X′) is independent of (Y,Y′).
• m ≥ c log(n′/ǫ), n ≥ 20c log logL log(n′/ǫ) + 6m and n′ ≥ 20c loglog aL log(n/ǫ).
Let (Wx,Wy) be the outputs of (NIPMx,NIPMy) on (V,X,Y) and (W
′
x,W
′
y) be the outputs of
the (NIPMx,NIPMy) on (V
′,X′,Y′). Then
(Wx,W
′
x,Y,Y
′) ≈O(Lǫ) (Um,W′x,Y,Y′)
and
(Wy,W
′
y, V, V
′,X,X′) ≈O(Lǫ) (UO(log(n/ǫ)),W′y, V, V ′,X,X′).
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Proof. First, since (V, V ′,X,X′) is independent of (Y,Y′), as long as c is large enough, by Theo-
rem 2.7 we know that for any i ∈ [L],
(Yi, V ) ≈ǫ (Ud, V ).
In addition, suppose for some h ∈ [L] we have that (Vh, V ′h) = (Um, V ′h), then we can first fix V ′h
and then Yh. Conditioned on this fixing Vh is still uniform, the average conditional min-entropy
of Y0 is at least 10 log logL · d− d > 3d and Vh and Y0 are still independent, thus by Theorem 2.7
we have that
(Yh,Y
′
h, V, V
′) ≈ǫ (Ud,Y′h, V, V ′).
In other words, the random variables {(Yi,Y′i)} inherit the properties of {(Vi, V ′i )}. We now ignore
the errors since this adds at most Lǫ to the final error. Now we fix (V, V ′). Note that conditioned
on this fixing, the random variables (Yi,Y
′
i) are deterministic functions of (Y0,Y
′
0), and are thus
independent of (X,X′). Furthermore, we have that conditioned on this fixing, X is still uniform.
In addition, even conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X
′
0), the average conditional min-entropy of X
is at least 20c log logL log(n′/ǫ)+6m−2 ·10 log logL ·d1 = 6m. Thus by the same argument before
we have that for any i ∈ [L],
(V i,Y0,X0,X
′
0) ≈ǫ (Um,Y0,X0,X′0),
and that there exists an h ∈ [L] such that
(V h, V
′
h,Y0,Y
′
0,X0,X
′
0) ≈ǫ (Um, V ′h,Y0,Y′0,X0,X′0).
We will again ignore the error for now since this adds at most Lǫ to the final error. Next, by
Lemma 3.2 we have that for any 0 ≤ j ≤ t− 1,
(Rj+1, (R1, R
′
1, · · · , Rj , R′j),Y0,Y′0) ≈O(tǫ) (U4d1 , (R1, R′1, · · · , Rj, R′j),Y0,Y′0).
Thus by a hybrid argument and the triangle inequality, we have that
(Y0,Y
′
0, R1, R
′
1, · · · , Rt, R′t) ≈O(t2ǫ) (Y0,Y′0, U4d1 , R′1, · · · , U4d1 , R′t),
where each U4d1 is independent of all the previous random variables (but may depend on later ran-
dom variables). From now on, we will proceed as if each Rj is uniform given (Y0,Y
′
0, {R1, R′1, · · · , Rj−1, R′j−1}),
since this only adds O(t2ǫ) to the final error.
Now we can fix (Y0,Y
′
0). Note that conditioned on this fixing, (V , V
′
, R1, R
′
1, · · · , Rt, R′t)
are deterministic functions of (V, V ′,X,X′), and thus independent of (Y,Y′). Also note that
conditioned on this fixing, the average conditional min-entropy of Y is at least 20 loglog a L · d2 −
2 · 10 log logL · d2 > a2 loglog a L · d2. We now prove the following claim.
Claim 4.12. Let Rj = (R1, · · · , Rj). Suppose that at the beginning of the j’th iteration, we have
that conditioned on the fixing of Rj−1, the following holds.
1. , (X,X′) is independent of (Y,Y′), and (Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Y2j ,Y′2j ) is a deterministic function
of (Y,Y′).
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2. For every h ∈ [2j ], the average conditional min-entropy of Yh given (Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Yh−1,Y′h−1)
is at least ( log
log a L
aj−2
− 1)d2.
Then at the end of the j’th iteration, the following holds.
1. Conditioned on the fixing of Rj , (X,X
′) is independent of (Y,Y′), and (Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Y2j+1 ,Y′2j+1)
is a deterministic function of (Y,Y′).
2. For every h ∈ [2j+1],
(Yh, (Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yh−1,Y′h−1), Rj) ≈ǫ (U( loglog a L
aj−1
−1)d2
, (Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yh−1,Y′h−1), Rj).
Proof of the claim. First, since the computation in the j’th iteration only involves (Rj , R
′
j) and
(Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Y2j ,Y′2j ), and (Rj , R′j) is a deterministic function of (X,X′) conditioned on the fixing
of the previous random variables, we know that at the end of the j’th iteration, conditioned on the
fixing of (R1, · · · , Rj) we have that (X,X′) is independent of (Y,Y′), and (Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Y2j+1 ,Y′2j+1)
is a deterministic function of (Y,Y′).
Next, we use (Z1, Z
′
1, · · · , Z2j+1 , Z ′2j+1) to represent the outputs computed from (Rj , R′j) and
(Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Y2j ,Y′2j ), and assume that 2ℓ − 1 ≤ h ≤ 2ℓ for some ℓ, then Zh is obtained from
Yℓ. We can now first fix (Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yℓ−1,Y′ℓ−1), and conditioned on this fixing Yℓ has average
conditional min-entropy at least ( log
log a L
aj−2
− 1)d2. Now by Lemma 3.2 we have that
(Sℓ1, Rj , R
′
j) ≈ǫ (U( loglog a L
aj−1
−1)d2
, Rj , R
′
j)
and
(Sℓ2, S
ℓ
1, S
′ℓ
1 , Rj , R
′
j) ≈ǫ (U( loglog a L
aj−1
−1)d2
, Sℓ1, S
′ℓ
1 , Rj , R
′
j),
since ( log
log a L
aj−2
−1)d2 ≥ 2·( log
log a L
aj−1
−1)d2+(1+α)( log
log a L
aj−1
−1)d2+d2 and 4d1 ≥ 2d1+1.1d1+0.9d1.
Thus as long as the constant c is large enough one can make sure that min{d2, 0.9d1} ≥ 2 log(1/ǫ),
and we can extract ( log
log a L
aj−1
− 1)d2 bits from entropy (1 + α)( log
log a L
aj−1
− 1)d2 and d1 bits from
entropy 1.1d1. Note that (Z1, Z
′
1, · · · , Z2ℓ−2, Z ′2ℓ−2) are computed from (Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Yℓ−1,Y′ℓ−1)
and (Rj , R
′
j), and (Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yℓ−1,Y′ℓ−1) are already fixed. Thus the second part of the claim
also holds.
Now note that at the beginning of the first iteration, the condition of the claim holds. Thus if
we ignore the errors, then we can apply the claim repeatedly until the end of the iteration. At this
time for each h ∈ [logL] we have that Yh has at least ( log
log a L
alog logL−1
− 1)d2 > d2 bits. Furthermore
(Yh, (Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Yh−1,Y′h−1), Rt) ≈ (U, (Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Yh−1,Y′h−1), Rt).
The total error so far is O(Lǫ) +O(t2ǫ) +
∑log logL
j=0 2
j · 2ǫ = O(Lǫ). Note that now conditioned
on all the fixed random variables (X0,X
′
0,Y0,Y
′
0, Rt) (note that Rt is a deterministic function of
(X0,X
′
0,Y0,Y
′
0), we have that (V, V
′,Y1,Y′1, · · · ,Y2 logL,Y′2 logL,X,X′) satisfies the conditions of
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the Lemma 4.5, since the average conditional min-entropy of X is at least n−20 log logL ·d1 ≥ 6m.
Now we can apply Lemma 4.5 to show that
(Wx,W
′
x,Y,Y
′) ≈ (Um,W′x,Y,Y′),
where the total error is O(Lǫ) + O(Lǫ) = O(Lǫ). Furthermore, note that conditioned on
the fixing of (Y1,Y
′
1, · · · ,Y2 logL,Y′2 logL), we have that (Wx,W′x) is a deterministic function of
(V, V ′,X,X′), and thus independent of (Y,Y′). Also note that Y has average conditional min-
entropy at least 20c loglog aL log(n/ǫ)− 4 logLd2 > 10d2. Thus by Theorem 2.7 we have that
(Wy,W
′
y,Wx,W
′
x) ≈ (Ud2 ,W′y,Wx,W′x),
where the error is O(Lǫ) + O(ǫ) = O(Lǫ). Note that given (Wx,W
′
x), we have that (Wy,W
′
y) is
a deterministic function of (Y,Y′). Thus we also have that
(Wy,W
′
y, V, V
′,X,X′) ≈O(Lǫ) (Ud2 ,W′y, V, V ′,X,X′).
5 Correlation Breaker with Advice
We now use our non-malleable independence preserving mergers to construct improved correlation
breakers with advice. A correlation breaker uses independent randomness to break the correlations
between several correlated random variables. The first correlation breaker appears implicitly in
the author’s work [Li13a], and this object is strengthened and formally defined in [Coh15]. A
correlation breaker with advice additionally uses some string as an advice. This object was first
introduced and used without its name in [CGL16], and then explicitly defined in [Coh16b].
Definition 5.1 (Correlation breaker with advice). A function
AdvCB : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d × {0, 1}L → {0, 1}m
is called a (k, k′, ε)-correlation breaker with advice if the following holds. Let Y, Y ′ be d-bit random
variables such that H∞(Y ) ≥ k′. Let X,X ′ be n-bit random variables with H∞(X) ≥ k, such that
(X,X ′) is independent of (Y, Y ′). Then, for any pair of distinct L-bit strings α,α′,
(AdvCB(X,Y, α),AdvCB(X ′, Y ′, α′)) ≈ε (U,AdvCB(X ′, Y ′, α′)).
In addition, we say that AdvCB is strong if
(AdvCB(X,Y, α),AdvCB(X ′, Y ′, α′), Y, Y ′)
≈ε(U,AdvCB(X ′, Y ′, α′), Y, Y ′).
Our construction needs the following flip-flop extraction scheme, which was constructed by
Cohen [Coh15] using alternating extraction, based on a previous similar construction of the author
[Li13a]. The flip-flop function can be viewed as a basic correlation breaker, which (informally) uses
an independent source X to break the correlation between two r.v’s Y and Y′, given an advice bit.
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Theorem 5.2 ([Coh15, CGL16]). There exists a constant c5.2 such that for all n > 0 and any
ǫ > 0, there exists an explicit function flip-flop : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m, m = 0.4k, satisfying
the following: Let X be an (n, k)-source, and X′ be a random variable on n bits arbitrarily correlated
with X. Let Y be an independent uniform seed on d bits, and Y′ be a random variable on d bits
arbitrarily correlated with Y. Suppose (X,X′) is independent of (Y,Y′). If k, d > C5.2 log(n/ǫ),
then for any bit b,
|flip-flop(X,Y, b),Y,Y′ − Um,Y,Y′| 6 ǫ.
Furthermore, for any bits b, b′ with b 6= b′,
|flip-flop(X,Y, b),flip-flop(X′,Y′, b′),Y,Y′
− Um,flip-flop(X′,Y′, b′),Y,Y′| 6 ǫ.
5.1 Asymmetric correlation breaker
We will present correlation breakers that use general NIPMs. By plugging in various NIPMs this
gives different correlation breakers.
Construction 5.3. Inputs:
• Let ℓ,m ∈ N be two integers, ǫ > 0 be an error parameter.
• X,Y , two independent sources on n bits and s bits respectively, with min-entropy at least
n− ℓ and s− ℓ.
• an advice string α ∈ {0, 1}L.
• An (L, d1, d2, O(Lǫ))-NIPMx that is strong in Y .
• Let IP be the two source extractor from Theorem 2.8.
1. Let d′ = O(log(max{n, s}/ǫ)) be the seed length of the extractor from Theorem 2.7, and let
d = 8d′. Let X0 be a slice of X with length d+ 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ), and Y 0 be a slice of Y with
length d+ 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ).
2. Compute Z = IP(X0, Y 0) and output d bits.
3. Use X and Z to do an alternating extraction, and output two random variables (X0,X1) =
laExt(X,Z) where each Xi has 3m bits.
4. Use Y and Z to do an alternating extraction, and output two random variables (Y0, Y1) =
laExt(Y,Z) where each Yi has 3d bits.
5. Use X1, Y1, α to obtain an L ×m matrix V , where for any i ∈ [L], Vi = flip-flop(X1, Y1, αi)
and outputs m bits.
6. Compute Xˆ = Ext(X,Y0) and output n/2 bits. Compute Yˆ = Ext(Y,X0) and output s/2
bits. Here Ext is the strong seeded extractor from Theorem 2.7.
7. Output Vˆ = NIPMx(V, Xˆ, Yˆ ).
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We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4. There exists a costant c > 1 such that the following holds. Suppose that there exists
an (L, d1, d2, O(Lǫ))-NIPM that is strong in Y which outputs m bits, then there exists an explicit
(n−ℓ, s−ℓ,O(Lǫ)) AdvCB : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}s×{0, 1}L → {0, 1}m as long as m ≥ c log(max{n, s}/ǫ),
n ≥ 20m+ 2d1 + 5ℓ+ 4 log(1/ǫ) and s ≥ m+ 2d2 + 5ℓ+ 4 log(1/ǫ).
Proof. Throughout the proof we will use letters with prime to denote the corresponding random
variables obtained from (X ′, Y ′, α′). First, notice that both X0 and Y 0 have min-entropy at least
d+ ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ). Thus by Theorem 2.8 we have that
(Z,X0) ≈ǫ (Ud,X0)
and
(Z, Y 0) ≈ǫ (Ud, Y 0).
We now ignore the error ǫ. Note that conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X ′0), (Z,Z ′) is a deter-
ministic function of (Y 0, Y ′0), and thus independent of (X,X ′). Moreover, the average conditional
min-entropy of X given this fixing is at least n − ℓ − 2(d + 2ℓ + 2 log(1/ǫ)) ≥ 10m as long as c is
large enough. Thus by Lemma 3.2 (note that the extractor from Z side can use seed length d′) we
have that
(Y 0, Y ′0,X0,X ′0,X1,X
′
1, Z, Z
′) ≈O(ǫ) (Y 0, Y ′0, U3m,X ′0, Ud1 ,X ′1, Z, Z ′),
where each U3m is uniform given the previous random variables, but may depend on later random
variables. Similarly, note that conditioned on the fixing of (Y 0, Y ′0), (Z,Z ′) is a deterministic
function of (X0,X ′0), and thus independent of (Y, Y ′). Moreover, the average conditional min-
entropy of Y given this fixing is at least s− ℓ− 2(d + 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ)) ≥ 10d. Thus by Lemma 3.2
we have that
(Y0, Y
′
0 , Y1, Y
′
1 , Z, Z
′,X0,X ′0) ≈O(ǫ) (U3d, Y ′0 , Ud2 , Y ′1 , Z, Z ′,X0,X ′0),
where each U3d is uniform given the previous random variables, but may depend on later
random variables. We can now fix (X0,X ′0, Y 0, Y ′0), and conditioned on this fixing, we have that
(X,X ′) and (Y, Y ′) are still independent, (X0,X ′0,X1,X
′
1) is a deterministic function of (X,X
′), and
(Y0, Y
′
0 , Y1, Y
′
1) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y
′). Further they satisfy the look-ahead properties
in the previous two equations. We will ignore the error for now since this only adds at most O(ǫ)
to the final error.
We now claim that conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X
′
0, Y0, Y
′
0 , Y1, Y
′
1) (and ignoring the error),
the random variables (V, V ′, Xˆ, Xˆ ′) and (Yˆ , Yˆ ′) satisfy the conditions required by Lemma 4.9. To
see this, note that if we fix (Y0, Y
′
0 , Y1, Y
′
1), then the average conditional min-entropy of Y is at least
s− ℓ− 2(d+ 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ))− 2 · 3d > 2s/3 as long as c is large enough. Thus by Theorem 2.7 we
have that
(Yˆ ,X0,X
′
0) ≈ǫ (Us/2,X0,X ′0).
Thus conditioned on the further fixing of (X0,X
′
0), we have that (Yˆ , Yˆ
′) is a deterministic
function of (Y, Y ′), and s/2 ≥ d2. On the other hand, conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X ′0) and
(Y0, Y
′
0), we have X1 is still close to uniform. Thus by Theorem 5.2 we have that for any i ∈ [L],
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|Vi, Y1, Y ′1 − Um, Y1, Y ′1 | 6 ǫ
and there exists i ∈ [L] such that
|Vi, V ′i , Y1, Y ′1 − Um, V ′i , Y1, Y ′1 | 6 ǫ.
We now further fix (Y1, Y
′
1). Note that conditioned on this fixing (X,X
′) and (Y, Y ′) are still
independent. Furthermore (V, V ′) is now a deterministic function of (X1,X ′1), and thus independent
of (Y, Y ′). Finally, note that conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X ′0,X1,X
′
1), the average conditional
min-entropy of X is at least n− ℓ− 2(d + 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ)) − 2 · 3m > 2n/3. Thus by Theorem 2.7
we have that
(Xˆ, Y0, Y
′
0) ≈ǫ (Un/2, Y0, Y ′0).
Thus conditioned on the further fixing of (Y0, Y
′
0), we have that (Xˆ, Xˆ
′) is a deterministic func-
tion of (X,X ′), and n/2 ≥ d1. Thus, even if conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X ′0,X1,X ′1, Y0, Y ′0 , Y1, Y ′1),
we have that (Xˆ is close to Un/2. Since (V, V
′) is obtained from (X1,X ′1, Y1, Y
′
1), we know that (Xˆ
is close to uniform even given (X0,X
′
0, Y0, Y
′
0 , Y1, Y
′
1) and (V, V
′). Thus by Lemma 4.9 we have that
(Vˆ , Vˆ ′, Y, Y ′) ≈ (Um, Vˆ ′, Y, Y ′),
where the error is O(Lǫ) +O(Lǫ) +O(ǫ) = O(Lǫ).
Next we give another correlation breaker, which recycles the randomness used.
Construction 5.5. Inputs:
• Let ℓ,m ∈ N be two integers, ǫ > 0 be an error parameter.
• X,Y , two independent sources on n bits with min-entropy at least n− ℓ.
• an advice string α ∈ {0, 1}L and an integer 2 ≤ t ≤ L.
• An (L, d1, d2, O(Lǫ))-NIPMy that is strong in X.
• Let IP be the two source extractor from Theorem 2.8.
1. Let d′ = O(log(n/ǫ)) be the seed length of the extractor from Theorem 2.7, and let d =
8 logLlog t d
′. Let X0 be a slice of X with length d+ 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ), and Y 0 be a slice of Y with
length d+ 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ).
2. Compute Z = IP(X0, Y 0) and output d bits.
3. Use X and Z to do an alternating extraction, and output 3 logLlog t + 1 random variables
X0, · · · ,X3 logL
log t
where each Xi has d1 bits.
4. Use Y and Z to do an alternating extraction, and output two random variables Y0, Y1 where
each Yi has d2 bits.
5. Use X0, Y0, α to obtain an L×m matrix V 0, where for any i ∈ [L], V 0i = flip-flop(X0, Y0, αi)
and outputs m bits.
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6. For i = 1 to logLlog t do the following. Merge every t rows of V
i−1 using NIPMy and (X3i−2, Yi),
and output d′ bits. Concatenate the outputs to become another matrix W i. Note that W i
has L/ti rows. Then for every row j ∈ [L/ti], compute V ij = Ext(X3i,W ij ) to obtain a new
matrix V i. Finally let Yi+1 = Ext(Y,X3i−1) and output d2 bits.
7. Output Vˆ = V
logL
log t .
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.6. There exists a costant c > 1 such that the following holds. Suppose that for any
t ∈ N there exists an (t, d1, d2, O(tǫ))-NIPMy that is strong in X which outputs d′ = O(log(n/ǫ))
bits, then there exists an explicit (n − ℓ, n − ℓ,O(Lǫ)) correlation breaker with advice AdvCB :
{0, 1}n×{0, 1}n×{0, 1}L → {0, 1}m as long as d1 ≥ 4m, m ≥ c log(d2/ǫ), and n ≥ c logLlog t log(n/ǫ)+
max{8 logLlog t d1, 2t · d′ + 4d2}+ 5ℓ+ 4 log(1/ǫ).
Proof. Throughout the proof we will use letters with prime to denote the corresponding random
variables obtained from (X ′, Y ′, α′). First, notice that both X0 and Y 0 have min-entropy at least
d+ ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ). Thus by Theorem 2.8 we have that
(Z,X0) ≈ǫ (Ud,X0)
and
(Z, Y 0) ≈ǫ (Ud, Y 0).
We now ignore the error ǫ. Note that conditioned on the fixing of (X0,X ′0), (Z,Z ′) is a deter-
ministic function of (Y 0, Y ′0), and thus independent of (X,X ′). Moreover, the average conditional
min-entropy of X given this fixing is at least n− ℓ− 2(d+ 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ)) ≥ 8 logLlog t d1 as long as c
is large enough. Thus by Lemma 3.2 (note that the extractor from Z side can use seed length d′)
we have that
(Y 0, Y ′0, Z, Z ′,X0,X ′0, · · · ,X3 logL
log t
,X ′
3 logL
log t
) ≈
O(( logL
log t
)2ǫ)
(Y 0, Y ′0, Z, Z ′, Ud1 ,X
′
0, · · · , Ud1 ,X ′3 logL
log t
),
where each Ud1 is uniform given the previous random variables, but may depend on later random
variables. Similarly, note that conditioned on the fixing of (Y 0, Y ′0), (Z,Z ′) is a deterministic
function of (X0,X ′0), and thus independent of (Y, Y ′). Moreover, the average conditional min-
entropy of Y given this fixing is at least n− ℓ− 2(d + 2ℓ+ 2 log(1/ǫ)) ≥ 4d2. Thus by Lemma 3.2
we have that
(Z,Z ′,X0,X ′0, Y0, Y ′0 , Y1, Y
′
1) ≈O(ǫ) (Z,Z ′,X0,X ′0, Ud2 , Y ′0 , Ud2),
where each Ud2 is uniform given the previous random variables, but may depend on later
random variables. We can now fix (X0,X ′0, Y 0, Y ′0), and conditioned on this fixing, we have that
(X,X ′) and (Y, Y ′) are still independent, (X0,X ′0, · · · ,X3 logL
log t
,X ′
3 logL
log t
) is a deterministic function
of (X,X ′), and (Y0, Y ′0 , Y1, Y
′
1) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y
′). Further they satisfy the look-
ahead properties in the previous two equations. We will ignore the error for now since this only
adds at most O(( logLlog t )
2ǫ) to the final error.
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Now by Theorem 5.2 we have that for any i ∈ [L],
|V 0i , Y0, Y ′0 − Um, Y0, Y ′0 | 6 ǫ
and there exists i ∈ [L] such that
|V 0i , V ′0i , Y0, Y ′0 − Um, V ′0i , Y0, Y ′0 | 6 ǫ.
We now further fix (Y0, Y
′
0). Note that conditioned on this fixing (X,X
′) and (Y, Y ′) are still inde-
pendent. Furthermore (V 0, V ′0) is now a deterministic function of (X0,X ′0), and thus independent
of (Y, Y ′). Thus by the property of NIPMy we have that for every row j in W 1,
(W 1j , V
0, V ′0,X1,X ′1) ≈O(tǫ) (Ud′ , V 0, V ′0,X1,X ′1),
and there exists a row j such that
(W 1j ,W
′1
j , V
0, V ′0,X1,X ′1) ≈O(tǫ) (Ud′ ,W ′1j , V 0, V ′0,X1,X ′1).
Note that we have fixed (X0,X ′0, Y 0, Y ′0), and if we further condition on the fixing of (X0,X ′0, Y0, Y
′
0 ,X1,X
′
1),
then (W 1,W ′1) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y ′). Furthermore (X,X ′) and (Y, Y ′) are still in-
dependent. We will now use induction to prove the following claim (note that we have already fixed
(X0,X ′0, Y 0, Y ′0)).
Claim 5.7. Let Ti = (Y0, Y
′
0 ,X0,X
′
0, · · · ,X3i−2,X ′3i−2). In the i’ th iteration, the following holds.
1. Conditioned on the further fixing of Ti, we have that (X,X
′) and (Y, Y ′) are still independent,
and furthermore (W i,W ′i) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y ′).
2. For every row j in W i,
(W ij , Ti) ≈ǫi (Ud′ , Ti),
and there exists a row j such that
(W ij ,W
′i
j , Ti) ≈ǫi (Ud′ ,W ′ij , Ti),
where ǫi = O(
∑i
j=1 t
jǫ).
Proof of the claim. The base case of i = 1 is already proved above. Now suppose the claim holds
for the i’th iteration, we show that it also holds for the i+ 1’th iteration.
To see this, note that conditioned on the fixing of Ti, (X,X
′) and (Y, Y ′) are still independent,
and furthermore (W i,W ′i) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y ′) and thus independent of (X,X ′).
Note that Yi+1 is computed from Y and X3i−1 while V i is computed from X3i and W i. Thus if we
further fix X3i−1,X ′3i−1 and (W
i,W ′i), then (X,X ′) and (Y, Y ′) are still independent, and further-
more Yi+1 is a deterministic function of Y and V
i is a deterministic function of X3i. Now W
i+1 is
computed from V i, X3i+1 and Yi+1. Thus if we further fix (X3i,X
′
3i) and (X3i+1,X
′
3i+1) (i.e., we
have fixed Ti+1) then (X,X
′) and (Y, Y ′) are still independent, and furthermore (W i+1,W ′i+1) is
a deterministic function of (Y, Y ′).
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Next, let h be the row in W i such that
(W ih,W
′i
h , Ti) ≈ǫi (Ud′ ,W ′ih , Ti).
Note that V i has the same number of rows as W i, and consider the merging of some t rows in
V i that contain row h into W i+1j (the merging of the other rows is similar and simpler). Without
loss of generality assume that these t rows are row 1, 2, · · · , t.
First, since for every row j in W i,
(W ij , Ti) ≈ǫi (Ud′ , Ti),
and rows h in W i and W ′i satisfy the independence property, by Theorem 2.7 (and ignoring
the error ǫi) we have that for every j ∈ [t],
(V ij , Ti,X3i−1,X
′
3i−1,W
i
j ,W
′i
j ) ≈ǫ (Um, Ti,X3i−1,X ′3i−1,W ij ,W ′ij ),
and
(V ih , V
′i
h , Ti,X3i−1,X
′
3i−1,W
i
j ,W
′i
j ) ≈ǫ (Um, V ′ih , Ti,X3i−1,X ′3i−1,W ij ,W ′ij ).
This is because X3i has average conditional min-entropy at least d1 even conditioned on the
fixing of (X3i−1,X ′3i−1). We now ignore the error ǫ. Note that conditioned on the fixing of (W
i
j ,W
′i
j ),
we have that (V ij , V
′i
j ) is a deterministic function of (X3i,X
′
3i), and thus independent of (Y, Y
′).
We now fix {(W ij ,W ′ij ), j ∈ [t]}. Note that conditioned on this fixing {V ij , j ∈ [t]} and {V ′ij , j ∈ [t]}
each is a t×m matrix, and a deterministic function of (X3i,X ′3i). Further note that they form two
matrices that meet the condition to apply an NIPM. Since {(W ij ,W ′ij ), j ∈ [t]} is a deterministic
function of (Y, Y ′), conditioned on this fixing (X,X ′) and (Y, Y ′) are still independent. Furthermore
the average conditional min-entropy of Y is at least n− ℓ−2(d+2ℓ+2 log(1/ǫ))−2d2−2td′ ≥ 2d2.
Thus by Theorem 2.7 we have that
(Yi+1,X3i−1) ≈ǫ (Ud2 ,X3i−1).
Note that conditioned on the fixing of X3i−1, we have that Yi+1 is a deterministic function of
Y . Thus we can now further fix (X3i−1,X ′3i−1), and conditioned on this fixing, Yi+1 is still close
to uniform. To conclude, now conditioned on the fixing of {(W ij ,W ′ij ), j ∈ [t]} and (X3i−1,X ′3i−1),
we have that {V ij , j ∈ [t]} and {V ′ij , j ∈ [t]} each is a t ×m matrix, and a deterministic function
of (X3i,X
′
3i); Yi+1 is still close to uniform and (Yi+1, Y
′
i+1) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y
′).
Furthermore X3i+1 is close to uniform. Now we can use the property of NIPMy to show that after
merging these t rows, the corresponding row j in W i+1 satisfies
(W i+1j ,W
′i+1
j , Ti,X3i−1,X
′
3i−1,X3i,X
′
3i,X3i+1,X
′
3i+1)
≈tǫ(Ud′ ,W ′i+1j , Ti,X3i−1,X ′3i−1,X3i,X ′3i,X3i+1,X ′3i+1).
Adding back all the errors we get that
(W i+1j ,W
′i+1
j , Ti+1) ≈ǫi+1 (Ud′ ,W ′i+1j , Ti+1),
where ǫi+1 = tǫi +O(tǫ) = O(
∑i+1
j=1 t
jǫ).
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Now we are basically done. In the last iteration we know that W
logL
log t has reduced to one row,
and W
logL
log t is close to uniform given W
′ logL
log t . Also conditioned on the fixing of T logL
log t
they are
deterministic functions of (Y, Y ′). Thus when we use W
logL
log t to extract V
logL
log t from X
3 logL
log t
, by
Theorem 2.7 we have that
(Vˆ , Vˆ ′, Y, Y ′) ≈ (Um, Vˆ ′, Y, Y ′),
where the error is O(
∑ logL
log t
j=1 t
jǫ) +O(( logLlog t )
2ǫ) = O(Lǫ).
6 The Constructions of Non-Malleable Extractors
In this section we construct our improved seeded non-malleable extractors and seedless non-
malleable extractors. Both the constructions follow the general approach developed in recent works
[CGL16, CL16, Coh16a, Li17], i.e., first obtaining an advice and then applying an appropriate
correlation breaker with advice. First we need the following advice generator from [CGL16].
Theorem 6.1 ([CGL16]). There exist a constant c > 0 such that for all n > 0 and any ǫ > 0,
there exists an explicit function AdvGen : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}L with L = c log(n/ǫ) satisfying
the following: Let X be an (n, k)-source, and Y be an independent uniform seed on d bits. Let
Y ′ be a random variable on d bits s.t Y ′ 6= Y , and (Y, Y ′) is independent of X. Then with
probability at least 1 − ǫ, AdvGen(X,Y ) 6= AdvGen(X,Y ′). Moreover, there is a deterministic
function g such that AdvGen(X,Y ) is computed as follows. Let Y1 be a small slice of Y with length
O(log(n/ǫ)), compute Z = Ext(X,Y1) where Ext is an optimal seeded extractor from Theorem 2.7
which outputs O(log(n/ǫ)) bits. Finally compute Y2 = g(Y,Z) which outputs O(log(1/ǫ)) bits and
let AdvGen(X,Y ) = (Y1, Y2).
For two independent sources we also have the following slightly different advice generator.
Theorem 6.2 ([CGL16]). There exist constants 0 < γ < β < 1 such that for all n > 0 and any
ǫ ≥ ǫ′ for some ǫ′ = 2−Ω(n), there exists an explicit function AdvGen : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}L
with L = 2βn + O(log(1/ǫ)) satisfying the following: Let X,Y be two independent (n, (1 − γ)n)-
sources, and (X ′, Y ′) be some tampered versions of (X,Y ), such that (X,X ′) is independent of
(Y, Y ′). Furthermore either X 6= X ′ or Y 6= Y ′. Then with probability at least 1−ǫ, AdvGen(X,Y ) 6=
AdvGen(X ′, Y ′). Moreover, there is a deterministic function g such that AdvGen(X,Y ) is com-
puted as follows. Let X1, Y1 be two small slice of X,Y respectively, with length βn, compute
Z = IP(X,Y1) where IP is the inner product two source extractor from Theorem 2.8 which out-
puts Ω(n) bits. Finally compute X2 = g(X,Z), Y2 = g(Y,Z) which both output O(log(1/ǫ)) bits and
let AdvGen(X,Y ) = (X1,X2, Y1, Y2).
By using these advice generators, the general approach of constructing seeded non-malleable
extractors and seedless non-malleable extractors can be summarized in the following two theorems.
Theorem 6.3. [CGL16, CL16, Coh16a, Li17] There is a constant c > 1 such that for any n, k, d ∈
N and ǫ1, ǫ2 > 0, if there is a (k− c log(n/ǫ1), d− c log(n/ǫ1), ǫ2) advice correlation breaker AdvCB :
{0, 1}k×{0, 1}d×{0, 1}c log(n/ǫ1) → {0, 1}m, then there exists an (O(k), ǫ1+ǫ2) seeded non-malleable
extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m. Furthermore if m ≥ c log(d/ǫ1) then there exists an
(O(k), ǫ1 + ǫ2) seeded non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}O(d) → {0, 1}Ω(k).
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Sketch. The seeded non-malleable extractor is constructed as follows. First use the seed and the
source to obtain an advice as in Theorem 6.1 with error ǫ1/3, however when we compute Z =
Ext(X,Y1) we in fact output Z1 = Ext(X,Y1) with k bits and choose Z to be a small slice of Z1
with length O(log(n/ǫ)). Then we can fix the random variables (Y1, Y
′
1 , Z, Z
′, Y2, Y ′2). Note that
conditioned on this fixing (X,X ′) is still independent of (Y, Y ′), and (Z1, Z ′1) is a deterministic
function of (X,X ′) thus is independent of (Y, Y ′). Furthermore with probability 1 − ǫ1/3, Z1 has
min-entropy at least k − O(log(n/ǫ1)) and Y has min-entropy at least d − O(log(n/ǫ1)). We can
now apply the correlation breaker to (Z1, Y ) and the advice to get the desired output, where the
total error is at most ǫ1/3 + ǫ1/3 + ǫ1/3 + ǫ2 = ǫ1 + ǫ2. If the output m is large enough (i.e.,
m ≥ c log(d/ǫ1)), then we can use it to extract from Y and then extract again from Z1 to increase
the output length to Ω(k).
Theorem 6.4. [CGL16, CL16, Coh16a, Li17] There are constants c > 1, 0 < γ < β < 1/100 such
that for any n ∈ N and ǫ1, ǫ2 > 0, if there is a ((1− 2β)n− c log(n/ǫ1), (1− 2β)n− c log(n/ǫ1), ǫ2)
advice correlation breaker AdvCB : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n×{0, 1}2βn+c log(1/ǫ1) → {0, 1}m, then there exists
an ((1−γ)n, (1−γ)n, ǫ1+ǫ2) non-malleable two source extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m.
Furthermore if m ≥ c log(n/ǫ1) then there exists an ((1− γ)n, (1− γ)n, ǫ1 + ǫ2) non-malleable two
source extractor nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}Ω(n).
Sketch. The non-malleable two-source extractor is constructed as follows. First use the two inde-
pendent sources (X,Y ) to obtain an advice as in Theorem 6.2 with error ǫ1/3, then we can fix the
random variables (X1,X
′
1, Y1, Y
′
1 ,X2,X
′
2, Y2, Y
′
2). Note that conditioned on this fixing (X,X
′) is
still independent of (Y, Y ′), furthermore with probability 1− ǫ1/3, both X and Y have min-entropy
at least (1 − γ)n − βn − c log(1/ǫ1) ≥ (1 − 2β)n − c log(1/ǫ1). We can now apply the correla-
tion breaker to (X,Y ) and the advice to get the desired output, where the total error is at most
ǫ1/3+ǫ1/3+ǫ1/3+ǫ2 = ǫ1+ǫ2. If the output m is large enough (i.e., m ≥ c log(d/ǫ1)), then we can
use it to extract from Y and then extract again from X to increase the output length to Ω(n).
Combined with our new correlation breakers with advice, we have the following new construc-
tions of non-malleable extractors.
Theorem 6.5. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any constant a ∈ N, a ≥ 2, any
n, k ∈ N and any 0 < ǫ < 1 with k ≥ C(log n + a log(1/ǫ)), there is an explicit construction
of a strong seeded (k, ǫ) non-malleable extractor {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n) +
log(1/ǫ)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a ) and m = Ω(k). Alternatively, we can also achieve entropy k ≥ C log n+
log(1/ǫ)2C·a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a and d = O(log n+ a log(1/ǫ)).
Proof. The theorem is obtained by combining Theorem 6.3, Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 4.9. We choose
an error ǫ′ to be the error in Theorem 6.3, Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 4.9. Thus the total error is
O(Lǫ′) where L = O(log(n/ǫ′)). To ensure O(Lǫ′) = ǫ it suffices to take ǫ′ = ǫc log(n/ǫ) for some
constant c > 1. We know ℓ = O(log(n/ǫ′)). Therefore to apply Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 4.9, we
need to find m,d′, d1, d2 such that
d′ ≥ c(logmax{d1, d2}+ log(1/ǫ′)),m ≥ d′, d1 ≥ 8a · d′ + 6m and d2 ≥ 8a · d′ + ca·log
1
a L · d′.
Then we can take
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k = O(d1 +m+ ℓ+ log(1/ǫ
′)) and d = O(d2 +m+ ℓ+ log(1/ǫ′)).
It can be seen that we can take m = O(log(n/ǫ′)), d′ = O(log log n + log(1/ǫ′)), d1 = 8a · d′ +
6m = O(log n + a log(1/ǫ′)) and d2 = 2O(a(log log(n/ǫ
′))
1
a ) · d′. We now consider two cases. First,
log(1/ǫ′) > logn
c′a(log logn)
1
a
for some large constant c′. In this case we have that
log(1/ǫ′) >
log n
c′a(log logn)
1
a
>
√
log n
for any a ≥ 2. Thus
log log(n/ǫ′)) = log(log n+ log(1/ǫ′)) < log(log2(1/ǫ′) + log(1/ǫ′)) < 2 log log(1/ǫ′) + 1.
Also note that d′ = O(log log n + log(1/ǫ′)) = O(log(1/ǫ′)). Thus in this case we have
d2 ≤ O(log(1/ǫ′))2O(a(log log(1/ǫ′))
1
a ) = log(1/ǫ′)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ
′))
1
a ). Next, consider the case where
log(1/ǫ′) ≤ logn
c′a(log logn)
1
a
. In this case note that we have log(1/ǫ′) < log n and thus 2O(a(log log(n/ǫ
′))
1
a ) <
2O(a(log log(n))
1
a ). Therefore when c′ is large enough and a ≥ 2 we have that
d2 ≤ 2O(a(log log(n))
1
a )(log log n+ log(1/ǫ′)) ≤ log n.
Therefore altogether we have that d2 ≤ (log n+log(1/ǫ′)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ′))
1
a )) and d = O(d2+m+
ℓ+ log(1/ǫ′)) = O(log n) + log(1/ǫ′)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ′))
1
a ). Note that log(1/ǫ′) = log(1/ǫ) + log(log n+
log(1/ǫ)) +O(1), a careful analysis similar as above shows that we also have that
d = O(log n) + log(1/ǫ)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a ).
Note that the correlation breaker is completely symmetric to both sources, and the only differ-
ence is in generating the advice. Thus after advice generation which costs both sources O(log(n/ǫ))
entropy, we can switch the role of the seed and the source. Therefore we can also get the other
setting of parameters where k ≥ C log n+log(1/ǫ)2C·a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a and d = O(log n+a log(1/ǫ)).
By using this theorem, we can actually improve the entropy requirement of the non-malleable
extractor. Specifically, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.6. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any constant a ∈ N, a ≥ 2, any
n, k ∈ N and any 0 < ǫ < 1 with k ≥ C(log log n + a log(1/ǫ)), there is an explicit construction
of a strong seeded (k, ǫ) non-malleable extractor {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n) +
log(1/ǫ)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a ) and m = Ω(k). Alternatively, we can also achieve entropy k ≥ C log log n+
log(1/ǫ)2C·a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a and d = O(log n+ a log(1/ǫ)).
Proof. We start by taking a slice of the seed Y1 with length O(log(n/ǫ)) to extract from the source,
and output some k′ = 0.9k uniform bits with error ǫ/2. Note that conditioned on the fixing of
(Y1, Y
′
1) where Y
′
1 is the tampered version, the two sources are still independent, and the seed now
has average conditional entropy at least d − O(log(n/ǫ)). We now switch the role of the seed and
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the source, and use the output of the extractor from the source as the seed of a non-malleable
extractor and apply Theorem 6.5 with error ǫ/2, so that the final error is ǫ.
Note that now we know the original seed is different from its tampered version, so we only need
to obtain advice from the original seed and thus the advice size is O(log(d/ǫ)). Now we only need
k ≥ C(log d+ a log(1/ǫ))
and
d−O(log(n/ǫ)) ≥ C log k + log(1/ǫ)2C·a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a .
Thus we can choose
k ≥ C ′(log log n+ a log(1/ǫ))
for some slightly larger constant C ′ > 1, while the requirement of the seed is still
d = O(log n) + log(1/ǫ)2O(a(log log(1/ǫ))
1
a ).
Similarly, we can switch the role of the seed and the source to get the other setting of parameters.
The next theorem improves the seed length, at the price of using a slightly larger entropy.
Theorem 6.7. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any n, k ∈ N and 0 < ǫ < 1 with
k ≥ C(log n + log(1/ǫ) log log log(1/ǫ)), there is an explicit construction of a strong seeded (k, ǫ)
non-malleable extractor {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n+ log(1/ǫ)(log log(1/ǫ))2) and
m = Ω(k).
Proof. The theorem is obtained by combining Theorem 6.3, Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 4.11. Again,
We choose an error ǫ′ to be the error in Theorem 6.3, Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 4.11. Thus the total
error is O(Lǫ′) where L = O(log(n/ǫ′)). To ensure O(Lǫ′) = ǫ it suffices to take ǫ′ = ǫc log(n/ǫ) for
some constant c > 1. We also know ℓ = O(log(n/ǫ′)) in Lemma 5.4. Thus to apply Lemma 4.11,
we need to find m,d1, d2 such that (for simplicity, we choose a = 4 in Lemma 4.11),
m ≥ c log(d2/ǫ′), d1 ≥ 20c log logL log(d2/ǫ′) + 6m and d2 ≥ 20c log2 L log(d1/ǫ′).
Then we can take
k = O(d1 +m+ ℓ+ log(1/ǫ
′)) and d = O(d2 +m+ ℓ+ log(1/ǫ′)).
A careful but tedious calculation shows that we can choose k ≥ C(log n+log(1/ǫ′) log log log(1/ǫ′))
for some large enough constant C > 1, and d = O(log n + log(1/ǫ′)(log log(1/ǫ′))2). Note that we
can choose m = O(log(n/ǫ′)) for a large enough constant in O(.), thus by Theorem 6.3 we can get
an output length of Ω(k). Finally, note that log(n/ǫ′) = O(log(n/ǫ)), thus the theorem follows.
Similar to what we have done above, we can also use this to get improved parameters. Specifi-
cally, we have
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Theorem 6.8. There exists a constant C > 1 such that for any n, k ∈ N and 0 < ǫ < 1 with
k ≥ C(log log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log log(1/ǫ)), there is an explicit construction of a strong seeded (k, ǫ)
non-malleable extractor {0, 1}n ×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(log n+ log(1/ǫ)(log log(1/ǫ))2) and
m = Ω(k). Alternatively, we can also achieve entropy k ≥ C(log log n + log(1/ǫ)(log log(1/ǫ))2)
and seed length d = O(log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log log(1/ǫ)).
For non-malleable two-source extractors we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.9. There exists a constant 0 < γ < 1 and a non-malleable two-source extractor for
(n, (1− γ)n) sources with error 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn) and output length Ω(n).
Proof. The theorem is obtained by combining Theorem 6.4, Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 4.9. Again,
we choose an error ǫ′ to be the error in Theorem 6.3, Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 4.11. Thus the total
error is O(Lǫ′) where L = O(n). To ensure O(Lǫ′) = ǫ it suffices to take ǫ′ = ǫcn for some constant
c. We also know ℓ = 2βn + o(n) for some constant β < 1/100 in Lemma 5.6. We choose a = 2
in Lemma 4.9 and thus we obtain a correlation breaker with m = O(log(n/ǫ′)), d1 = O(log(n/ǫ′))
and d2 = log(n/ǫ
′)2O(
√
log t) where t is the parameter in Construction 5.5 with t ≤ L. Note that
this also satisfies that d1 ≥ 4m and m ≥ c log(d2/ǫ) as required by Lemma 5.6.
Now we need to ensure that
(1− β)n ≥ c logL
log t
log(n/ǫ′) +max{8logL
log t
d1, 2t · d′ + 4d2}+ 5ℓ+ 4 log(1/ǫ′),
where d′ = O(log(n/ǫ′)). We choose t = logLlog logL and this gives us
(1− 12β)n ≥ C logL
log logL
log(n/ǫ′),
for some constant C > 1. Note that log(n/ǫ′) = O(log(n/ǫ)) thus we can set ǫ = 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn)
and satisfy the above inequality.
For applications in two-source extractors, we first need the following generalization of non-
malleable extractors, which allows multiple tampering.
Definition 6.10 (Seeded t-Non-malleable extractor). A function snmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d →
{0, 1}m is a seeded t-non-malleable extractor for min-entropy k and error ǫ if the following holds :
If X is a source on {0, 1}n with min-entropy k and A1, · · · ,At : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d are t arbitrary
tampering functions with no fixed points, then
|snmExt(X,Ud) ◦ {snmExt(X,Ai(Ud)), i ∈ [t]} ◦ Ud − Um ◦ {snmExt(X,Ai(Ud)), i ∈ [t]} ◦ Ud| < ǫ
where Um is independent of Ud and X.
The following theorem is a special case of Theorem 8.6 proved in [Li17].
Theorem 6.11. Suppose there is a function f , a constant γ > 0 and an explicit non-malleable
two-source extractor for (f(ǫ), (1 − γ)f(ǫ)) sources with error ǫ and output length Ω(f(ǫ)). Then
there is a constant C > 0 such that for any 0 < ǫ < 1 with k ≥ Ct2(log n+f(ǫ)), there is an explicit
strong seeded t-non-malleable extractor for (n, k) sources with seed length d = Ct2(log n + f(ǫ)),
error O(tǫ) and output length Ω(f(ǫ)).
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Combined with Theorem 6.9, this immediately gives the following theorem.
Theorem 6.12. There is a constant C > 0 such that for any 0 < ǫ < 1 and n, k ∈ N with
k ≥ Ct2(log n + log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)log log log(1/ǫ) ), there is an explicit strong seeded t-non-malleable extractor for
(n, k) sources with seed length d = Ct2(log n + log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)log log log(1/ǫ) ), error O(tǫ) and output length
Ω(k/t2). As a special case, there exists a seeded non-malleable extractor for entropy k ≥ C(log n+
log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)
log log log(1/ǫ) ) and seed length d = C(log n+
log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)
log log log(1/ǫ) ).
Similar techniques as above can reduce the log n term in the entropy requirement to log log n,
so we get
Theorem 6.13. There is a constant C > 0 such that for any 0 < ǫ < 1 and n, k ∈ N with
k ≥ C(log log n + log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)log log log(1/ǫ) ), there is an explicit strong seeded non-malleable extractor for
(n, k) sources with seed length and seed length d = C(log n+ log(1/ǫ) log log(1/ǫ)log log log(1/ǫ) ).
Ben-Aroya et. al [BADTS17] proved the following theorem.
Theorem 6.14. [BADTS17] Suppose there is a function f and an explicit strong seeded t-non-
malleable extractor (n, k′) sources with seed length and entropy requirement d = k′ = f(t, ǫ), then
for every constant ǫ > 0 there exist constants t = t(ǫ), c = c(ǫ) and an explicit extractor Ext :
({0, 1}n)2 → {0, 1} for two independent (n, k) sources with k ≥ f(t, 1/nc) and error ǫ.
Combined with Theorem 6.7, this immediately gives the following theorem.
Theorem 6.15. For every constant ǫ > 0, there exists a constant C > 1 and an explicit two source
extractor Ext : ({0, 1}n)2 → {0, 1} for entropy k ≥ C logn log lognlog log logn with error ǫ.
7 Non-Malleable Two-Source Extractor and Non-Malleable Code
Formally, non-malleable codes are defined as follows.
Definition 7.1. [ADKO15] Let NMk denote the set of trivial manipulation functions on k-bit
strings, which consists of the identity function I(x) = x and all constant functions fc(x) = c,
where c ∈ {0, 1}k . Let E : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}m be an efficient randomized encoding function, and
D : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}k be an efficient deterministic decoding function. Let F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m be
some class of functions. We say that the pair (E,D) defines an (F , k, ǫ)-non-malleable code, if for
all f ∈ F there exists a probability distribution G over NMk, such that for all x ∈ {0, 1}k , we have
|D(f(E(x))) −G(x)| ≤ ǫ.
Remark 7.2. The above definition is slightly different form the original definition in [DPW10].
However, [ADKO15] shows that the two definitions are equivalent.
We will mainly be focusing on the following family of tampering functions in this paper.
Definition 7.3. Given any t > 1, let Stn denote the tampering family in the t-split-state-model,
where the adversary applies t arbitrarily correlated functions h1, · · · , ht to t separate, n-bit parts
of string. Each hi can only be applied to the i-th part individually.
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We remark that even though the functions h1, · · · , ht can be correlated, their correlation is
independent of the original codewords. Thus, they are actually a convex combination of independent
functions, applied to each part of the codeword. Therefore, without loss of generality we can assume
that each hi is a deterministic function, which acts on the i-th part of the codeword individually.We
will mainly consider the case of t = 2, i.e., the two-split-state model. We recall the original definition
of non-malleable two-source extractors by Cheraghchi and Gursuswami [CG14b]. First we define
the following function.
copy(x, y) =
{
x if x 6= same⋆
y if x = same⋆
Definition 7.4 (Seedless Non-Malleable 2-Source Extractor). A function nmExt : ({0, 1}n)2 →
{0, 1}m is a (k, ǫ)-seedless non-malleable extractor for two independent sources, if it satisfies the
following property: Let X,Y be two independent (n, k) sources, and f1, f2 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be
two arbitrary tampering functions, then
1. |nmExt(X,Y )− Um| ≤ ǫ.
2. There is a distribution D over {0, 1}m ∪ {same⋆} such that for an independent Z sampled
from D, we have
(nmExt(X,Y ), nmExt(f1(X), f2(Y ))) ≈ǫ (nmExt(X,Y ), copy(Z, nmExt(X,Y ))).
Cheraghchi and Gursuswami [CG14b] showed that the relaxed definition 1.5 implies the above
general definition with a small loss in parameters. Specifically, we have
Lemma 7.5 ([CG14b]). Let nmExt be a (k − log(1/ǫ), ǫ)-non-malleable two-source extractor ac-
cording to Definition 1.5. Then nmExt is a (k, 4ǫ)-non-malleable two-source extractor according to
Definition 7.4.
The following theorem was proved by Cheraghchi and Gursuswami [CG14b], which establishes
a connection between seedless non-malleable extractors and non-malleable codes.
Theorem 7.6. Let nmExt : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be a polynomial time computable seedless
2-non-malleable extractor at min-entropy n with error ǫ. Then there exists an explicit non-malleable
code with an efficient decoder in the 2-split-state model with block length = 2n, rate = m2n and error
= 2m+1ǫ.
One can construct a non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model from a non-malleable two-
source extractor as follows: Given any message s ∈ {0, 1}m, the encoding Enc(s) is done by out-
putting a uniformly random string from the set nmExt−1(s) ⊂ {0, 1}2n. Given any codeword
c ∈ {0, 1}2n, the decoding Dec(c) is done by outputting nmExt(c). Thus, to get an efficient encoder
we need a way to efficiently uniformly sample from the pre-image of any output of the extractor.
Since our new non-malleable two-source extractor follows the same structure as in [Li17], we
can use the same sampling procedure there to efficiently uniformly sample from the pre-image of
any output of the extractor. We briefly recall the construction and sampling procedure in [Li17].
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The extractor construction and sampling. The high level structure of the non-malleable two-
source extractor in [Li17] is as follows. First take two small slices (X1, Y1) of both sources and apply
the inner product based two-source extractor, as in Theorem 2.8. Then, use the output to sample
O(log(1/ǫ)) bits from the encodings of both sources, using a randomness efficient sampler and an
asymptotically good linear encoding of the sources. We need an asymptotically good encoding
since then we only need to sample O(log(1/ǫ)) bits to ensure that the sampling of two different
codewords are different with probability at least 1 − ǫ. The advice is then obtained by combining
the slices and the sample bits. Now, take two larger slices (X2, Y2) of both sources and apply the
correlation breaker. Finally, take another larger slice of either source (say X3 from X) and apply
a strong linear seeded extractor, which is easy to invert and has the same pre-image size for any
output. By limiting the size of each slice to be small, the construction ensures that there are at
least n/2 bits of each source that are only used in the encoding of the sources but never used in
the subsequent extraction.
Now to sample uniformly from the pre-image of any output, we first uniformly independently
generate the slices (X1, Y1,X2, Y2) and the sampled bits Z. From these we can compute the coor-
dinates of the sampled bits and the output of the correlation breaker. Now we can invert the linear
seeded extractor and uniformly sample X3 given the output of the extractor and the output of the
correlation breaker (which is used as the seed of the linear seeded extractor). Now, to sample the
rest of the bits, we need to condition on the event that the sample bits from the encoding of the
sources are indeed Z. Note that Z has size at most αn for some small constant α < 1/2 since we
can restrict the error to be at least some 2−Ω(n). Also note that for each source we have already
sampled some bits but there are still at least n/2 un-sampled free bits, thus we insist on that no
matter which αn columns of the generating matrix of the encoding we look at, the sub matrix
corresponding to these columns and the last n/2 rows have full column rank. If this is true then
no matter which coordinates we use and what Z is, the pre-image always have the same size and
we can uniformly sample from the pre-image by solving a system of linear equations.
In [Li17], we use the Reed-Solomn encoding for each source with field Fq for q ≈ n. This is
asymptotically good and also satisfies the property that any sub matrix with less columns than
rows has full column rank since it is a Vandermonde matrix. However in this case each symbol has
roughly log n bits so we can sample at most n/ log n symbols (otherwise fixing them may already
cost us all the entropy), thus the best error we can get using this encoding is 2−n/ logn.
We now give a new construction of non-malleable two-source extractors for two (n, (1 − γ)n)
sources, where 0 < γ < 1 is some constant. First, we need the following ingredients.
Theorem 7.7 ([Li17]). There exists a constant 0 < α < 1 such that for any n ∈ N and 2−αn < ǫ < 1
there exists a linear seeded strong extractor IExt : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}0.3d with d = O(log(n/ǫ))
and the following property. If X is a (n, 0.9n) source and R is an independent uniform seed on
{0, 1}d, then
|(IExt(X,R), R) − (U0.3d, R)| ≤ ǫ.
Furthermore for any s ∈ {0, 1}0.3d and any r ∈ {0, 1}d, |IExt(·, r)−1(s)| = 2n−0.3d.
Definition 7.8 (Averaging sampler [Vad04]). A function Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]t is a (µ, θ, γ) av-
eraging sampler if for every function f : [n] → [0, 1] with average value 1n
∑
i f(i) > µ, it holds
that
Pr
i1,...,it←Samp(UR)
[
1
t
∑
i
f(i) < µ− θ
]
≤ γ.
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Samp has distinct samples if for every x ∈ {0, 1}r , the samples produced by Samp(x) are all distinct.
Theorem 7.9 ([Vad04]). Let 1 ≥ δ ≥ 3τ > 0. Suppose that Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]t is an (µ, θ, γ)
averaging sampler with distinct samples for µ = (δ − 2τ)/ log(1/τ) and θ = τ/ log(1/τ). Then for
every δn-source X on {0, 1}n, the random variable (Ur,XSamp(Ur)) is (γ+2−Ω(τn))-close to (Ur,W )
where for every a ∈ {0, 1}r, the random variable W |Ur=a is (δ − 3τ)t-source.
Theorem 7.10 ([Vad04]). For every 0 < θ < µ < 1, γ > 0, and n ∈ N, there is an explicit (µ, θ, γ)
averaging sampler Samp : {0, 1}r → [n]t that uses
• t distinct samples for any t ∈ [t0, n], where t0 = O( 1θ2 log(1/γ)), and
• r = log(n/t) + log(1/γ)poly(1/θ) random bits.
7.1 A new advice generator
Here we show that we can give a new advice generator with optimal advice length. We have the
following construction. Let (X,Y ) be two independent (n, (1 − τ)n) sources. Let IP be the inner
product two-source extractor from Theorem 2.8, and Samp : be the sampler from Theorem 7.9. Let
L > 0 be a parameter, and c > 0 be a constant to be chosen later. We have the following algorithm.
1. Let n1 = 3τn. DivideX intoX = (X1,X2) such thatX1 has n1 bits andX2 has n2 = (1−3τ)n
bits. Similarly divide Y into Y = (Y1, Y2) such that Y1 has n1 bits and Y2 has n2 = (1− 3τ)n
bits.
2. Compute Z = IP(X1, Y1) which outputs r = Ω(n) ≤ τn bits.
item Let F be the finite field F2log n . Let n0 =
n2
logn . Let RS : F
n0 → Fn be the Reed-Solomon
code encoding n0 symbols of F to n symbols in F (we slightly abuse the use of RS to denote
both the code and the encoder). Thus RS is a [n, n0, n − n0 + 1]n error correcting code. Let
Xˆ2 be X2 written backwards, and similarly Yˆ2 be Y2 written backwards. Let X2 = RS(Xˆ2)
and Y 2 = RS(Yˆ2).
3. Use Z to sample r/ log n distinct symbols from X2 (i.e., use each log n bits to sample a
symbol), and write the symbols as a binary string X˜2. Note that X˜2 has r bits. Similarly,
use Z to sample r/ log n distinct symbols from Y 2 and obtain a binary string Y˜2 with r bits.
4. Let V1 = X1 ◦ Y1 ◦ X˜2 ◦ Y˜2.
5. Take a slice of X2 with length 15τn, and let it be X3. Similarly, take a slice of Y2 with length
10τn, and let it be Y3. Compute W = IP(X3, Y3) which outputs r = Ω(n) ≤ τn bits.
6. Take a slice of X2 with length 40τn, and let it be X4. Use W and X4 to do an alternating
extraction protocol for L = log∗ n6 rounds, and output (R1, · · · , RL) = laExt(X4,W ), where
each Si, Ri used in the alternating extraction has τn/ log n bits.
6Here by log∗ n we mean the number of steps it takes to get down to c′ by computing n → c log n for some
constants c, c′.
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7. Set i = 1 and let n1 be the length of V1, which is at most 8τn. While L < c log ni do the
following: encode Vi to V˜i using an asymptotically good binary error correcting code. Cut Ri
into O(log ni) bits. Use the sampler from Theorem 7.10 and Ri to sample log ni bits of V˜i,
let the sampled string be Vi. Set Vi+1 = Ri ◦ Vi and let i = i+ 1.
8. Finally, cut Ri into O(log ni) bits. Use the sampler from Theorem 7.10 and Ri to sample
L− |Ri| bits of V˜i, let the sampled string be Vi. Set α˜ = Ri ◦ Vi which has length L.
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 7.11. There are constants 0 < τ, µ < 1 and C > 1 such that the following holds. Let (X,Y )
be two independent (n, (1−τ)n) sources, and (X ′, Y ′) be their tampered versions. Assume that either
the tampering function f on X or the tampering function g on Y has no fixed point. For any L
such that C ≤ L ≤ µnlogn , with probability 1 − 2−Ω(L) over the fixing of (X1, Y1, X˜2, Y˜2,X3, Y3,X4)
and the tampered versions (X ′1, Y
′
1 , X˜
′
2, Y˜
′
2 ,X
′
3, Y
′
3 ,X
′
4), we have that α˜ 6= α˜′. Moreover, conditioned
on these fixings, X and Y are independent, and the average conditional min-entropy of both X and
Y is (1−O(τ))n.
Proof. As usual we use letters with primes to denote the tampered versions of random variables.
First note that both X1 and Y1 have min-entropy at least 2τn, thus by Theorem 2.8, we have that
(Z,X1) ≈2−Ω(n) (U,X1),
and
(Z, Y1) ≈2−Ω(n) (U, Y1).
If X1 6= X ′1 or Y1 6= Y ′1 then we have V1 6= V ′1 . Now consider the case where X1 6= X ′1 and
Y1 6= Y ′1 . In this case we have Z = Z ′ and either X2 6= X ′2 or Y2 6= Y ′2 . Without loss of generality
assume that X2 6= X ′2. We can now first fix (X1,X ′1). Note that conditioned on this fixing, Z = Z ′
is a deterministic function of Y , and thus independent of (X2,X
′
2). The Reed-Solomon encoding
of Xˆ2 and Xˆ
′
2 ensures that X2 and X
′
2 differ in at least n − n0 + 1 > 0.9n symbols. Thus, with
probability 1 − 2−Ω(n) − 2−Ω(r/ logn) = 1 − 2−Ω(n/ logn) over Z, we have that X˜2 6= X˜ ′2. Therefore,
altogether with probability 1 − 2−Ω(n/ logn) over the fixing of (X1, Y1, X˜2, Y˜2) and (X ′1, Y ′1 , X˜ ′2, Y˜ ′2)
we have that V1 6= V ′1 .
We now fix (X1, Y1, X˜2, Y˜2) and (X
′
1, Y
′
1 , X˜
′
2, Y˜
′
2). Note that conditioned on this fixing, X and
Y are independent. Moreover, the average conditional min-entropy of both X3 and Y3 is at least
15τn − τn− 2τn − 3τn = 9τn. Thus by Theorem 2.8, we have that
(W,X3) ≈2−Ω(n) (U,X3).
We ignore the error for now since this only adds 2−Ω(n) to the final error. We now fix
(X3,X
′
3). Note that conditioned on this fixing, (W,W
′) is a deterministic function of (Y, Y ′),
and thus independent of (X,X ′). Further, the average conditional min-entropy of X4 is at least
40τn − τn− 2(15τn + τn)− 3τn = 4τn. Thus by Lemma 3.2 we have that for any 0 ≤ j ≤ L− 1,
(W,W ′, {R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, Rj+1) ≈ǫ′ (W,W ′, {R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, U),
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where ǫ′ = O(L2−Ω(n/ logn)) = 2−Ω(n/ logn). Since conditioned on the fixing of (W,W ′), the
random variables {Ri, R′i} are deterministic functions of (X,X ′) and independent of (Y, Y ′), we
also have that
(Y3, Y
′
3 , {R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, Rj+1) ≈ǫ′ (Y3, Y ′3 , {R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, U).
We now further fix (Y3, Y
′
3). Note that now we have fixed (X1, Y1, X˜2, Y˜2,X3, Y3) and (X
′
1, Y
′
1 , X˜
′
2, Y˜
′
2 ,X
′
3, Y
′
3).
Ignoring the error for now let’s assume that V1 6= V ′1 (note that (V1, V ′1) are now fixed) and for any
0 ≤ j ≤ L− 1,
({R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, Rj+1) = ({R1, R′1, · · · , Rj , R′j}, U).
Let j be the index when the protocol executes step 8. We know that j ≤ L since in each
step the length of the string Vi goes from ni to O(log ni). We have the following observation. For
any 1 ≤ i ≤ j, we have that Vi is a deterministic function of (R1, · · · , Ri−1); similarly, V ′i is a
deterministic function of (R′1, · · · , R′i−1). Next, we have the following claim.
Claim 7.12. For any 1 ≤ i < j, suppose that conditioned on the fixing of (R1, · · · , Ri−1), (R′1, · · · , R′i−1)
we have Vi 6= V ′i , then with probability 1 − 2−Ω(logni) over the further fixing of (Ri, R′i), we have
Vi+1 6= V ′i+1. Suppose that conditioned on the fixing of (R1, · · · , Rj−1), (R′1, · · · , R′j−1) we have
Vj 6= V ′j , then with probability 1− 2−Ω(L) over the further fixing of (Rj , R′j), we have α˜ 6= α˜′.
Proof of the claim. Suppose that conditioned on the fixing of (R1, · · · , Ri−1), (R′1, · · · , R′i−1) we
have Vi 6= V ′i . Note that now (Vi, V ′i ) is also fixed. We know that Ri is still uniform. Again, we
have two cases. First, if Ri 6= R′i, then we definitely have Vi+1 6= V ′i+1. Otherwise, we have Ri = R′i.
The encoding of Vi and V
′
i ensures that at least a constant fraction of bits in V˜i and V˜i
′
are different.
Thus by Theorem 7.10 with probability 1 − 2−Ω(log ni) over the further fixing of (Ri, R′i), we have
that Vi 6= Vi′ and thus Vi+1 6= V ′i+1.
For the case of i = j, the argument is the same, except now we are sampling L−O(log nj) bits,
and the probability that Vi 6= Vi′ is 2−Ω(L−O(lognj)) = 2−Ω(L) since L ≥ c log nj .
Now we are basically done. Since we start with V1 6= V ′1 , at the end the probability that α˜ 6= α˜′
is at least
Πj−1i=1 (1− 2−Ω(log ni)) · (1− 2−Ω(L)).
Note that for any 1 ≤ i < j we have ni+1 = O(log ni), so 2−Ω(log ni) ≤ 2−Ω(logni)/2. Thus
the terms 2−Ω(log ni) form at least a geometric expression and hence this probability is at least
1−O(2−Ω(L)) = 1− 2−Ω(L). Adding back all the errors, and noticing that C ≤ L ≤ µnlogn for some
properly chosen constants C and µ, the final error is still 1 − 2−Ω(L). Moreover, since the size
of each random variable in (X1, Y1, X˜2, Y˜2,X3, Y3,X4) is at most O(τn), conditioned on the fixing
of (X1, Y1, X˜2, Y˜2,X3, Y3,X4) and the tampered versions (X
′
1, Y
′
1 , X˜
′
2, Y˜
′
2 ,X
′
3, Y
′
3 ,X
′
4), the average
conditional min-entropy of both X and Y is (1−O(τ))n.
We now use the above advice generator to give a new construction of non-malleable two-source
extractors. Let (X,Y ) be two independent (n, (1−γ)n) sources with γ ≤ τ where τ is the constant
in Lemma 7.11.
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• Let AdvGen be the advice generator from Lemma 7.11 for some error ǫ1.
• Let AdvCB be the correlation breaker with advice from Lemma 5.6 with error some ǫ2, using
the merger from Lemma 4.9.
• Let IExt be the invertible linear seeded extractor form Theorem 7.7.
1. Compute α˜ = AdvGen(X,Y ).
2. Consider the unused part of X. Divide it into (X5,X6,X7) where X5,X6 has length αn, βn
for some constants β > α > γ, and X7 is the rest of X with length at least n/2. Similarly,
divide the unused part of Y into (Y5, Y6, Y7) where Y5, Y6 has length αn, βn and Y7 is the rest
of Y with length at least n/2 (this can be ensured by choosing α, β, γ to be small enough).
3. Compute V = AdvCB(X5, Y5, α˜) which outputs d = O(log(n/ǫ2)) bits.
4. Finally compute W = IExt(Y6, V ) which outputs Ω(n) bits.
We need the following proposition.
Proposition 7.13. [CG14b] Let D and D′ be distributions over the same finite space Ω, and
suppose they are ǫ-close to each other. Let E ⊆ Ω be any event such that D(E) = p. Then, the
conditional distributions D|E and D′|E are (ǫ/p)-close.
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.14. Assume that either the tampering function f on X or the tampering function g on
Y has no fixed point. There exist a constant C > 1 such that as long as n ≥ C log log(1/ǫ1)log log log(1/ǫ1) log(n/ǫ2),
the above non-malleable two-source extractor gives a non-malleable code with error ǫ1+O(log(1/ǫ1)
√
ǫ2)
and rate Ω(log(1/ǫ2)/n).
Proof. First note that by Lemma 7.11, conditioned on the fixing of H = (X1, Y1, X˜2, Y˜2,X3, Y3,X4)
and the tampered versions H ′ = (X ′1, Y
′
1 , X˜
′
2, Y˜
′
2 ,X
′
3, Y
′
3 ,X
′
4), X and Y are independent, and the
average conditional min-entropy of both X and Y is (1 − O(γ))n. If in addition we have that
α˜ 6= α˜′, then we will apply Lemma 5.6 and Lemma 4.9. Note that in order to set the error of the
advice generator to be ǫ1, we need to set the advice length to be L = O(log(1/ǫ1)) by Lemma 7.11.
Thus in Lemma 5.6 we need to merge L = O(log(1/ǫ1)) rows.
Again, as in Theorem 6.9, we know that when we apply the correlation breaker to X5 and Y5,
the entropy loss of both of them is O(γn). By choosing α, β, γ appropriately we can ensure that
X5 and Y5 have sufficient entropy in them. We choose a = 2 in Lemma 4.9 and thus we obtain a
correlation breaker with m = O(log(n/ǫ2)), d1 = O(log(n/ǫ2)) and d2 = log(n/ǫ2)2
O(
√
log t) where
t is the parameter in Construction 5.5 with t ≤ L. Note that this also satisfies that d1 ≥ 4m and
m ≥ c log(d2/ǫ) as required by Lemma 5.6.
Now we need to ensure that
(α−O(γ))n ≥ c logL
log t
log(n/ǫ2) +max{8log L
log t
d1, 2t · d′ + 4d2}+ 5ℓ+ 4 log(1/ǫ2),
where d′ = O(log(n/ǫ2)). We choose t = logLlog logL and this gives us
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n ≥ C logL
log logL
log(n/ǫ2),
for some constant C > 1. That is, we need
n ≥ C log log(1/ǫ1)
log log log(1/ǫ1)
log(n/ǫ2),
for some constants C > 1. As long as this condition is satisfied, conditioned on the event that
α˜ 6= α˜′, we have that
(V, V ′,H,H ′,X,X ′) ≈O(Lǫ2) (U, V ′,H,H ′,X,X ′).
By choosing β > α appropriately, we can ensure that conditioned on the fixing of the previous
random variables in the computation, Y6 has entropy Ω(n) and (V, V
′) is a deterministic function
of (X,X ′) and thus independent of (Y, Y ′). Thus eventually we get
(W,W ′,H,H ′,X,X ′) ≈O(Lǫ2) (U,W ′,H,H ′,X,X ′).
However, note that our construction is a two-source extractor itself. Thus, regardless of whether
α˜ 6= α˜′, we have that
(W,H,H ′,X,X ′) ≈O(Lǫ2) (U,H,H ′,X,X ′).
We can cut the output length of the extractor to be m = Θ(log(1/ǫ2)) such that for any s in
the support, we have Pr[U = s] = 2−m =
√
ǫ2. Thus we have for any s,
(H,H ′,X,X ′|W = s) ≈O(L√ǫ2) (H,H ′,X,X ′|U = s).
This means for any s,
(H,H ′,X,X ′|W = s) ≈O(L√ǫ2) (H,H ′,X,X ′).
Let A be the event that α˜ 6= α˜′. Note that Pr[A] ≥ 1 − ǫ1. Since A is determined by (H,H ′),
we have that for any s, |Pr[A|W = s]− Pr[A]| ≤ O(L√ǫ2).
We now consider the probability distribution (W ′|W = s,A). This time we first condition on
A. Note that conditioned on this event, we have
(W,W ′,H,H ′,X,X ′) ≈O(Lǫ2) (U,W ′,H,H ′,X,X ′).
Thus again here we have that for any s,
(W ′,H,H ′,X,X ′|W = s) ≈O(L√ǫ2) (W ′,H,H ′,X,X ′).
Therefore, we have for any s,
(W ′|W = s,A) ≈O(L√ǫ2) (W ′|A).
We can now bound the statistical distance between (W ′|W = s) and W ′. We have
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∣∣(W ′|W = s)−W ′∣∣
=
∣∣(Pr[A|W = s](W ′|W = s,A) + Pr[A¯|W = s](W ′|W = s, A¯))− (Pr[A](W ′|A) + Pr[A¯](W ′|A¯))∣∣
≤ ∣∣Pr[A]((W ′|W = s,A)−W ′|A)∣∣+ ∣∣(Pr[A|W = s]− Pr[A])(W ′|W = s,A)∣∣
+
∣∣Pr[A¯]((W ′|W = s, A¯)− (W ′|A¯))∣∣+ ∣∣(Pr[A¯|W = s]− Pr[A¯])(W ′|W = s, A¯)∣∣
≤ ∣∣Pr[A]((W ′|W = s,A)−W ′|A)∣∣+ ∣∣Pr[A¯]((W ′|W = s, A¯)− (W ′|A¯))∣∣ +O(L√ǫ2)
≤
∣∣((W ′|W = s,A)−W ′|A)∣∣+ Pr[A¯]
≤ǫ1 +O(L√ǫ2).
Note that the distribution of W ′ is a fixed probability distribution which is independent of s.
Thus the construction gives a non-malleable code with error ǫ1+O(L
√
ǫ2) = ǫ1+O(log(1/ǫ1)
√
ǫ2),
and the rate of the code is Ω(log(1/ǫ2)/n).
We need to use the following simple inequality:
Fact 7.15. For any 0 < x ≤ 1/3, we have 1− 3x ≤ 1−x1+x < 1+x1−x ≤ 1 + 3x.
We now have the following lemma, which gives a construction of non-malleable codes in the
general case.
Lemma 7.16. Assume 2Ext : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m satisfies the following conditions:
• It is a two-source extractor for entropy n− log(1/ǫ′) with error ǫ′ ≤ 2−(m+2).
• It is a non-malleable two-source extractor for entropy n−log(1/ǫ′), which gives a non-malleable
code in the two-split state model with error ǫ when either the tampering function f or the
tampering function g has no fixed point.
Then 2Ext gives non-malleable code in the two-split state model with error ǫ+ 2m+4ǫ′.
Proof. Consider the tampering function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Let X and
Y be two independent uniform distributions on {0, 1}n, let p0 = Pr[f(X) = X], q0 = Pr[g(Y ) = Y ],
p1 = Pr[f(X) 6= X] = 1−p0 and q1 = Pr[g(Y ) 6= Y ] = 1−q0. Let the subsource ofX conditioned on
f(X) = X beX0, and the subsource of X conditioned on f(X) 6= X beX1. ThusX = p0X0+p1X1.
Similarly, we can define the subsources Y0, Y1 of Y such that Y = q0Y0 + q1Y1.
Consider the pairs of subsources (X0, Y0), (X0, Y1), (X1, Y0), and (X1, Y1), which have proba-
bility mass p0q0, p0q1, p1q0 and p1q1 respectively. Note that we have
(X,Y ) = p0q0(X0, Y0) + p0q1(X0, Y1) + p1q0(X1, Y0) + p1q1(X1, Y1).
Let W = 2Ext(X,Y ). Consider any s ∈ {0, 1}m and the uniform distribution on the pre-image
of W = s in (X,Y ), call it Zs. For any i, j ∈ {0, 1}, let the subsource Zij stand for the uniform
distribution on the pre-image of W = s in (Xi, Yj). Further let rij = Pr[2Ext(Xi, Yj) = s]. Then
we have
Zs =
∑
i,j piqjrijZij∑
i,j piqjrij
=
∑
i,j
αijZij ,
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where αij =
piqjrij∑
i,j piqjrij
.
We now have the following claim.
Claim 7.17. For any i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
• If either pi < ǫ′ or qj < ǫ′, then αij ≤ 2m+1ǫ′.
• Otherwise, |αij/(piqj)− 1| ≤ 2m+2ǫ′
Proof of the claim. Note that
∑
i,j piqjrij = Pr[W = s], and we have Pr[W = s] ≥ 2−m − ǫ′ >
2−(m+1). Thus if either pi < ǫ′ or qj < ǫ′, we have
αij =
piqjrij∑
i,j piqjrij
< 2m+1ǫ′.
Otherwise, both pi ≥ ǫ′ and qj ≥ ǫ′. This means that both Xi and Yj have min-entropy at least
n − log(1/ǫ′). Therefore we have |rij − 2−m| ≤ ǫ′. Note that αij/(piqj) = rij/Pr[W = s] and we
also have .|Pr[W = s]− 2−m| ≤ ǫ′. Since ǫ′ ≤ 2−(m+2) by Fact 7.15 we have that
|αij/(piqj)− 1| ≤ 2m+2ǫ′.
We now consider the distribution 2Ext(T (Zs)), where for any distribution Z on {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n,
T (Z) stands for the distribution (f(x), g(y)) where (x, y) is sampled from Z. Note that 2Ext(Zs)
is fixed to s and and 2Ext(T (Zs)) is the distribution of the decoded message after tampering. We
have that T (Zs) =
∑
i,j αijT (Zij) and 2Ext(T (Zs)) =
∑
i,j αij2Ext(T (Zij)). We will show that
this distribution is close to the following distribution. For any i, j ∈ {0, 1} that are not both 0,
if either pi < ǫ
′ or qj < ǫ′, we define the distribution Dij on {0, 1}m to be a fixed constant (e.g.,
Pr[Dij = 0
m] = 1); otherwise since both Xi and Yj have min-entropy at least n − log(1/ǫ′), 2Ext
gives a non-malleable code and thus 2Ext(T (Zij) is ǫ-close to a distribution Dij independent of s.
We let D00 be the distribution obtained by the identity function, i.e., for any s, D00 is fixed to be
I(s) = s. We now claim that 2Ext(T (Zs)) is close to the distribution
∑
i,j piqjDij . We have
∣∣∣∣∣∣2Ext(T (Zs))−
∑
i,j
piqjDij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j
αij2Ext(T (Zij))−
∑
i,j
piqjDij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
i,j
|αij2Ext(T (Zij))− piqjDij | .
For any i, j ∈ {0, 1}, if either pi < ǫ′ or qj < ǫ′, we have the following bound.
|αij2Ext(T (Zij))− piqjDij | ≤ |αij2Ext(T (Zij))|+ |piqjDij | ≤ 2m+1ǫ′ + ǫ′ < 2m+2ǫ′.
Otherwise if i, j are not both 0 we have the following bound.
|αij2Ext(T (Zij))− piqjDij | ≤ piqj|2Ext(T (Zij))−Dij |+ |(αij −piqj)2Ext(T (Zij))| ≤ piqjǫ+2m+2ǫ′.
For the case of i = j = 0, we have that for any (x, y) ∈ Supp(Z00), f(x) = x and g(y) = y.
Thus 2Ext(T (Zij)) = s = D00 and we have
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|αij2Ext(T (Zij))− piqjDij| ≤ piqj|2Ext(T (Zij))−Dij |+ |(αij − piqj)2Ext(T (Zij))| ≤ 2m+2ǫ′.
Therefore altogether we have∣∣∣∣∣∣2Ext(T (Zs))−
∑
i,j
piqjDij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
i,j
(piqjǫ+ 2
m+2ǫ′) = ǫ+ 2m+4ǫ′.
Since
∑
i,j piqjDij is obtained by G(s) where G is a fixed probability distribution on the identity
function and constant functions (the distribution of G only depends on f and g, but not on s), this
implies that we have a non-malleable code in the 2 split-state model with error ǫ+ 2m+4ǫ′.
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.18. There are constants 0 < η, µ < 1 such that for any n ∈ N and 2− µnlogn ≤ ǫ ≤ η
there exists an explicit non-malleable code in the 2-split-state model with block length 2n, rate
Ω( log log log(1/ǫ)log log(1/ǫ) ) and error ǫ.
Proof. We combine Theorem 7.14 and Lemma 7.16. Note that in Theorem 7.14, the construction is
itself a two-source extractor for entropy (1−γ)n with error O(log(1/ǫ1)ǫ2). To apply Theorem 7.14,
we just need to ensure that
n ≥ C log log(1/ǫ1)
log log log(1/ǫ1)
log(n/ǫ2)
for some constant C > 1. We set ǫ1 = ǫ/2 and ǫ2 = 2
−Ω( log log log(1/ǫ)n
log log(1/ǫ)
)
. Note that
C
log log(1/ǫ1)
log log log(1/ǫ1)
log(n/ǫ2) = O(
log log(1/ǫ)
log log log(1/ǫ)
log n) +O(
log log(1/ǫ)
log log log(1/ǫ)
log(1/ǫ2)).
Since 2−
µn
logn ≤ ǫ we have log log(1/ǫ)log log log(1/ǫ) log n = O( log
2 n
log logn). Thus we can set ǫ2 = 2
−Ω( log log log(1/ǫ)n
log log(1/ǫ)
)
to satisfy the inequality. Now we apply Lemma 7.16. We can set ǫ′ = O(log(1/ǫ1)ǫ2) since by
Theorem 7.14 the construction is both a two-source extractor and a non-malleable two-source
extractor for entropy (1 − γ)n, and as long as ǫ ≤ η for some appropriately chosen η < 1 we have
log(1/ǫ′) ≤ γn. Since in Theorem 7.14 we set the output of the extractor to be m = Θ(log(1/ǫ2))
such that 2−m =
√
ǫ2, we have that ǫ
′ ≤ 2−(m+2) and 2m+4ǫ′ = O(log(1/ǫ1)√ǫ2). Thus by
Lemma 7.16 the final error of the non-malleable code is
ǫ1 +O(log(1/ǫ1)
√
ǫ2) + 2
m+4ǫ′ = ǫ/2 +O(log(1/ǫ)
√
ǫ2).
Finally, notice that
√
ǫ2 = 2
−Ω( log log log(1/ǫ)n
log log(1/ǫ)
) ≤ α ǫ
log(1/ǫ)
for any arbitrary constant α > 0, since the latter is at least 1n2
− µn
log n and ǫ2 is 2
−Ω(n log log n
logn
)
.
Thus the final error of the non-malleable code is at most ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ, while the rate of the code,
by Theorem 7.14, is Ω(log(1/ǫ2)/n) = Ω(
log log log(1/ǫ)
log log(1/ǫ) ).
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Next, we show how to achieve better error in the non-malleable two-source extractor and non-
malleable codes. Recall that a bottleneck for error is the use of Reed-Solomon code in the con-
struction. In order to get better error, we instead use a binary linear error correcting code and
its generating matrix. It is easy to show using standard probabilistic argument that there exists a
binary generating matrix that satisfies our requirements.
Theorem 7.19. There exists constants 0 < α, β < 1 such that for any n ∈ N there exists an
n×m matrix over F2 with n = βm which is the generating matrix of an asymptotically good code.
Furthermore, Any sub-matrix formed by taking αn columns and the last n/2 rows has full column
rank. In addition, for some ǫ = 2−O(n), an ǫ-biased sample space over nm bits generates such a
matrix with probability 1− 2−Ω(n).
Proof. We take an ǫ-biased sample space over nm bits for some ǫ = 2−O(n). First, consider the
sum of the rows over any non-empty subset of the rows. The sum is an m-bit string such that any
non-empty parity is ǫ-close to uniform. Thus by the XOR lemma it is 2m/2ǫ-close to uniform. We
know a uniform m-bit string has weight d = m/4 with probability at least 1−2−Ω(m). Thus for this
string the probability is at least 1− 2−Ω(m)− 2m/2ǫ. By a union bound the total failure probability
is at most 2n(2−Ω(m) + 2m/2ǫ) = 2−Ω(n) by an appropriate choice of β and ǫ = 2−O(n).
Next, consider any sub-matrix formed by taking βm columns and the last n/2 rows, if it’s truly
uniform, then the probability that it has full column rank is at least 1−αn2αn−n/2 ≥ 1− 2−n/4 for
α < 1/5. Now by a union bound the total failure probability is at most(
m
αn
)
(2−n/4 + ǫ) ≤
(em
αn
)αn
2−n/4+1 =
(
e
βα
)αn
2−n/4+1,
if we choose ǫ < 2−n/4. Note that for a fixed β, the quantity ( eβα)
α goes to 1 as α goes to
0. Thus we can choose α small enough such that this failure probability is also 2−Ω(n). Therefore
altogether the failure probability is 2−Ω(n).
Note that an ǫ-biased sample space over nm bits can be generated using O(log(nm/ǫ)) = O(n)
bits if ǫ = 2−O(n). Now for any length n ∈ N, we can compute the generating matrix (either using
an ǫ-biased sample space or compute it deterministically in 2O(n) time) once in the pre-processing
step, and when we do encoding and decoding of the non-malleable code, all computation can be
done in polynomial time.
Combining Theorem 7.6 and Theorem 6.9, we immediately obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 7.20. For any n ∈ N there exists a non-malleable code with efficient encoder/decoder in
the 2-split-state model with block length 2n, rate Ω(log log n/ log n) and error = 2−Ω(n log logn/ logn).
8 Discussion and Open Problems
Several natural open problems remain here. The most intriguing one is how far we can push our
new techniques. As mentioned above, one bottleneck here is that the computation of the merger is
not a small space computation. If one can find a more succinct way to represent the computation,
then it will certainly lead to further improvements (e.g., decrease the entropy requirement in two-
source extractors to O(log n
√
log log n)). If in addition we can find a way to apply the recursive
construction as in Nisan’s generator [Nis92], then it is potentially possible to decrease the entropy
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requirement in two-source extractors to O(log n log log log n). We also believe our approach has
the potential to eventually achieve truly optimal (up to constants) constructions. In addition, our
techniques of treating the errors separately in non-malleable two-source extractors, may be useful
in helping improve the rate of non-malleable codes for other classes of tampering functions (e.g.,
the affine tampering function and small depth circuits studied in [CL17]).
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